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An Itty-Bitty Immunity and Its Consequences for
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints:
A Response to Professors Lupu and Tuttle
Cheryl B. Preston.∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The confluence of religion and sexual abuse has become a matter
of substantial debate. Everyone agrees that sexual abuse by a
member of the clergy is wrong. The arguments erupt when we begin
to tease out when sex is abusive and what to do about it, particularly
what the law should do about it. For those committed to the
preservation of religious autonomy in the United States, the
unfettered tort liability of religious institutions is not a comfortable
prospect, although the train seems to have left the station headed in
that direction.1 Finding a compromise between using social and state
authority to address the admitted evil of the abuse of power—
particularly as it rains down primarily on women and children—and
preserving of religious freedom is a daunting task.
Professors Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle’s paper, Sexual
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity,2 effectively traces the history
and status of the ecclesiastical immunity doctrine and then attempts
∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I thank
Addy Squires, Maria Miles, Sarah Mumford, and Jill Rencher for their excellent research,
editing, and ideas, and my colleagues Cliff Fleming, Jim Gordon, Fred Gedicks, and Kif
Augustine-Adams, as well as Von Keetch, for wise and useful comments on earlier drafts. I also
thank Professors Lupu and Tuttle for writing such a thorough, thought-provoking article for
me to study and discuss.
1. Professors Lupu and Tuttle observe that “the past several decades have witnessed a
quite remarkable trend away from recognition of First Amendment defenses and a judicial
willingness to impose liability upon clergy—and their supervisors—at least as broad as the
liability imposed upon analogous secular enterprises.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1794 (presented at the
2004 Church Autonomy Conference, Feb. 7, 2004, sponsored by the J. Reuben Clark Law
School and the International Center for Law and Religion Studies); see also id. at 1804–05
(“[R]eligion-distinctive tort immunities have been disappearing, and they will continue to
vanish to the point of extinction.”); id. at 1796 (“erosion of charitable immunity”); id. at 1798
(“dramatically increased [] exposure of religious organizations to liability”).
2. Id. at 1789.
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to provide a framework for understanding a widely divergent and
inconsistent body of case law arising from claims of sexual abuse by
clergy. They categorize cases by their doctrinal premises, providing a
basis for a clearer and more consistent understanding of existing law.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle then provide a normative argument
for preserving some form of ecclesiastical immunity from the
onslaught of unrestricted tort liability,3 but only in “highly
particularized legal contexts.”4 Professors Lupu and Tuttle assert that
the free exercise approach to ecclesiastical immunity is a dead end.5
They resort instead to the Establishment Clause and the notion that
with Separationism “government is constitutionally disabled from
addressing or asserting control over ultimate questions.”6 Based on
this principle, they propose, first, to shield the individual
priest/perpetrator when the abuse involves an adult victim, is not a
crime, and does not arise during a secular7 or secular-like8 counseling
relationship.
With respect to individual liability, Professors Lupu and Tuttle
argue that, when claims reach beyond offending clergymen9 to the
sponsoring organization, such claims “cannot help but touch the
institutional arrangements and theological understandings that
inform the structure of faith communities and their leadership,”10
since churches will feel the pressure to “internalize state-imposed
changes in organizational structure”11 and will ultimately be forced
to “rearrange[] . . . structure, policy or practice.”12 Professors Lupu
and Tuttle then offer suggestions for the protection of churches and
supervisors, including primarily a proposal to limit liability for
negligent hiring, training, and supervising to cases in which the

3. Id. at 1795–96.
4. Id. at 1896.
5. See id. at 1816.
6. Id. at 1796.
7. See id. at 1828.
8. See id. at 1831 (citing McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 353 (D.C.
1998) (affirming liability when relationship included “giving counsel or advice . . . similar to
that usually given by psychologists or psychologists [sic]”)).
9. Professors Lupu and Tuttle use the term “clergyman” because the vast majority of
the perpetrators of sexual abuse are men. Id. at 1817 n.104. I use interchangeably terms from
various religious traditions, including priest, minister, pastor, bishop, cleric, and so forth.
10. Id. at 1817.
11. Id. at 1841.
12. Id. at 1845.
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defendant had “actual malice,” as that standard has developed in the
freedom of the press cases.13
I ally myself with Professors Lupu and Tuttle on many fronts. I
am sympathetic to the concerns raised in Sexual Misconduct
regarding the risks to churches, and I endorse Professors Lupu and
Tuttle’s stated objective of finding “an optimal legal arrangement
[that will] balance the concerns of the tort system . . . on one hand,
with the constitutional concerns regarding structural autonomy of
religious institutions, on the other.”14 I also accept, for purposes of
this Article, Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s position that the
Establishment Clause, for the reasons given in Sexual Misconduct,
provides doctrinal support for at least some protections to religious
organizations from the consequences of tort liability. I assume, for
purposes of this response, that adult victims15 are almost exclusively
female.16 Finally, I accept Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s notion that
standards drawn from the law of libel can provide a structure for
reconciling tort law and the constitutional interests of religions in the
13. Id. at 1861.
14. Id. at 1795.
15. For the proposition that the standards for children and adult victims should be the
same, see Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy,
8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 45, 47 n.9 (2001).
16. In studies of clergy sexual abuse, there is little to no discussion of abuse against
males as adults. “Gary Schoener, a Minneapolis psychologist with experience in more than
2,000 clergy sexual abuse cases, says he has seen six times more teenage and adult female
victims as compared to boys.” Tamara Turner, Don’t Blame Gays for Catholic Church
Scandal, at http://www.socialism.com/currents/CatholicChurch.html (June 19, 2002).
Although Schoener specifically address adult female victims as well as teenage female victims,
with respect to male victims, only abuse of minors is mentioned. Id. What is more,
[t]herapist and ex-priest A.W. Richard Sipes has also found that predatory priests
mostly target females, primarily adult women. But he believes most child and
teenage victims are male, probably because of the church’s sex segregation policy.
He feels strongly this is due to opportunity, not sexual orientation, comparing it to
sex between heterosexual men in prison.
Id. Although there are cases of male adults being sexually abused, these cases involve violence
in prison or domestic abuse. See also Paul J. Isely & David Gehrenbeck-Shim, Sexual Assault of
Men in the Community, 25 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 159, 161 (1997), available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/46090/PDFSTART. This kind of
violence does not coincide with the usually more coercive and persuasive sexual touching by
clergy in a pastoral setting. Moreover, in the Isely & Gehrenbeck-Shim study, there were no
reports of sexual assaults against male adults taking place at a church or religious institution or
of the perpetrator being a clergyman. Id. at 163. Clergy abuse against males occurs primarily in
boys because “[c]hildren are easier to intimidate than adults and not as likely to be believed.”
Turner, supra. See generally Lana Stermac et al., Sexual Assault of Adult Males, 11 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 52 (1996).
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context of liability for the wrongful hiring, training, and supervising
of clergy.17
Beyond these points of consensus, however, I fear that the “legal
arrangement”18 offered by Professors Lupu and Tuttle provides an
insufficient account of the “distinctive constitutional place of
religious institutions.”19 The pressures of changing cultural norms,20
heightened awareness of sexual exploitation and power imbalances,21
declining reputations of religious institutions generally (magnified by
the recent clergy abuse scandals),22 eroded legal immunities,23 and
expanding tort theories are pushing courts toward unrestricted
assessments of liability against clergy and churches. An account of
constitutional exceptionality rugged enough to withstand this
pressure must be concrete and based on defensible distinctions.
Similar to the concern of Angela Carmella,24 I fear that fuzzy
conceptions of constitutional immunity will not only “fail but will
poison the well in ways that render courts deeply resistant to more
reasonable assertions of ecclesiastical immunity.”25
In this response, I argue that Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
normative vision, although a positive step in the right direction,
ultimately is insufficient. It covers too few cases, is in some
particulars too vague, relies on a few distinctions that are too slippery
or are not convincing, and underestimates the risk of the causes of
action that remain after applying their suggested cautions. Thus,
their proposal falls short of their stated objective to reach “a wellreasoned account of the distinctive constitutional place of religious
institutions.”26
In Part II.A of this Article, I consider the categories of
protection and nonprotection drawn by Professors Lupu and Tuttle.
I address the narrow and relatively rare category of cases for which

17. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1795.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 1798.
21. See id. at 1800.
22. See id. at 1798.
23. See id. at 1794.
24. See Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1054–55 (2003).
25. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1817.
26. Id. at 1795.
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Professors Lupu and Tuttle make a normative argument for
constitutional protection. Then I note the limited and vague nature
of most of the constitutional immunities suggested by Professors
Lupu and Tuttle.
In Part II.B, I argue first that some of the lines Professors Lupu
and Tuttle draw dividing the kind of counseling cases that warrant
constitutional considerations from those that do not are tenuous and
problematic. In addition, the comparisons they draw between clergy
and financial fiduciaries are contestable. I then suggest that
Professors Lupu and Tuttle perhaps underestimate the risks posed by
expansive interpretations of institutional fiduciary duty and vicarious
liability. The end result is that, with the notable exception of
supervisory torts, Professors Lupu and Tuttle do little to strike a
balance between the demands of tort law and the constitutional
distinctiveness of religion.
In Part III, I apply the normative rules suggested by Professors
Lupu and Tuttle in the context of claims against The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“the Church”) and its priesthood
leaders. By applying their analysis in a concrete context, we can
better understand the permutations of the problem and the scope of
the solutions. Although Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s proposal
provides some useful guidelines as applied to the Church, the line
between professional and nonprofessional counseling collapses, and
with it the shield of immunity that should be available to protect
Latter-day Saint clergy. But in other respects, an application of their
proposal to the Church affirms the concerns raised by Professors
Lupu and Tuttle and illustrates some benefits of their proposal.
II. PROFESSORS LUPU AND TUTTLE’S SWATH OF PROTECTION
A. The Narrow Slice of Protection
In this section, I delineate the categories of cases in which
Professors Lupu and Tuttle concede that there should be no
religious immunity and then show these categories to be so broad
that they leave only a few kinds of cases where clergy and churches
benefit from immunity under Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
normative scheme. In addition, I argue that the kinds of protections
offered by Professors Lupu and Tuttle are in some respects no more
than vague cautions.
1949

7PRE-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/13/2004 12:39 PM

[2004

1. Liability of individual perpetrators
Professors Lupu and Tuttle agree with the imposition of civil
liability on individual clergymen for sexual abuse against children and
those “who lack capacity to consent,”27 and with the imposition of
criminal liability for any abuse that fits within a criminal statute.28 By
excluding from protection clergy who are charged with abusing
children, Professors Lupu and Tuttle limit their Establishment
Clause protections to a small percentage of cases—those involving
female adult victims. Professors Lupu and Tuttle acknowledge that
“cases in which an adult is the victim have received less public
attention than those involving children.”29 Certainly, part of the
reason for that is their relative rarity. The reported cases and available
quantitative data suggest that the majority of victims are under age
eighteen.30 For instance, the recently released report issued by the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops refers to nearly
11,000 sexual abuse claims between 1950 and 2002, and none of
this vast number involved adult victims.31 Similarly, a comprehensive
Web page lists the allegations of sexual abuse brought against clergy
of the Catholic Church in the United States.32 Of the 252 cases in
which the victim’s age is given, only fourteen of the victims were
adults.33 On another Web site,34 all but 44 of 517 allegations of

27. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1797.
28. See id. at 1819.
29. Id. at 1794.
30. In contrast, Patrick Schiltz, who has represented or advised religious organizations
in connection with over 500 clergy sexual misconduct cases, representing almost every major
Christian denomination in the U.S., disagrees that the victims are mostly children. Patrick J.
Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV.
949, 949 (2003). He reports that, in the cases he worked on, the most common allegation was
a sexual affair with a female adult. Id. at 967; see also id. at 950 n.1 (claiming that with nonCatholic pastors the victims are “overwhelmingly female”).
31. See JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 70 (2004), at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2004). According to the report, approximately 77% of victims were ages 11–17,
17% were ages 8–10, and about 6% were age 7 or younger. Id.
32. See Catholics for a Free Choice, Sexual Abuse and Misconduct in the Catholic
Church; Selected Cases from Media Reports Through 2002, at http://www.catholicsfor
choice.org/international/SexAbuseChart.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
33. Id. Fourteen were females between age fifteen and eighteen.
34. See The Complete List, at www.reformation.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
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abuse by leaders 35 of various religions in the United States involved
victims under age eighteen.36
If churches are liable under fiduciary duty, supervisory torts, or
respondeat superior, in the many cases involving children, churches
will feel pressure to “internalize state-imposed changes in
organizational structure”37 and will ultimately be forced to
“rearrange[] . . . structure, policy or practice,”38 as Professors Lupu
and Tuttle fear, even if they were to be fully shielded in cases
involving adult victims. While even a single betrayal of an adult
woman or one unconstitutional invasion of religious autonomy is too
many, the judicial pressure from cases involving minors will influence
churches’ choices so monumentally that the results in the few cases
involving adult victims will be rendered relatively insignificant.
Finding the appropriate immunity in the adult cases may be an
admirable goal; however, this project needs to be understood against
the sheer weight of cases involving victims under age eighteen.
In a further restriction of scope, Professors Lupu and Tuttle also
condone the imposition of liability against individual clergymen who
commit sexual abuse while acting as professional counselors in a
secular sense39 or in “circumstances functionally identical to secular
counseling.”40 I argue later that their distinction between secular
counseling and other counseling is contestable; however, even if
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s definitions shield spiritual counseling,
that exclusion is relatively insignificant. Professors Lupu and Tuttle
admit that the “vast majority of cases of clergy sexual misconduct
with adult victims . . . arise from counseling relationships” that

35. Id. The survey listed 838 total allegations of sexual misconduct by protestant clergy.
Of those, 147 of the accused clerics are listed as Baptist, 251 as “Bible Church”
(evangelical/fundamentalist), 140 as Anglican/Episcopalian, 38 as Lutheran, 46 as Methodist,
19 as Presbyterian, and 197 as “various religions.” Id. Within the “various” category, sixteen
of the accused are identified as affiliated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
two of which are identified in leadership positions in the Church, five of which held ancillary
lay positions such as clerk or sunday school teacher, and nine of which are merely members or
previous members of the Church. See id.
36. See id. Forty-four of the cases involved female victims over age eighteen, and 114 of
the cases involved female teenagers. See id. In contrast, Patrick Schiltz disagrees that the victims
are mostly children. See supra note 30.
37. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1841.
38. Id. at 1845.
39. See id. at 1821.
40. Id. at 1832.
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involve secular matters.41 For instance, a 1988–89 study of sixty-two
civil suits against ministers and their churches for sexual abuse
revealed that all of the cases involving adult victims arose in
counseling relationships that dealt with matters typically handled by
secular therapists.42 Because Professors Lupu and Tuttle concede
liability in adult therapeutic counseling cases, none of these
defendants would benefit from any kind of ecclesiastical immunity
under the limited scheme proposed by Professors Lupu and Tuttle.
Moreover, Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not, in fact, provide
for immunity in every adult abuse case arising in nonsecular
counseling.43 “[W]e do not conclude that sex between a cleric and
his congregant is actionable only if the cleric is engaged in the
practice of secular therapeutic counseling.”44 In this category of case,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle do suggest that courts be “reticent” to
impose liability45 and “that judicial assessment . . . requires
heightened sensitivity to the constitutional problems inherent in
such adjudications.”46 But other than these vague cautions,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle offer a shield of immunity for only a tiny
slice of potential cases—those involving adult victims whose abuse
did not occur in any remotely secular-comparable setting or as a
result of criminal acts.
2. Liability of supervisors and religious institutions
With regard to nonperpetrator supervisors and churches as
entities, Professors Lupu and Tuttle address three types of liability—
institutional fiduciary duty, supervisory torts, and respondeat
superior. With respect to liability based on the institutional fiduciary
duty owed by the supervisor or the church directly to the victim,47
Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest a variety of doctrinal failings and
policies weighing against this form of action, but acknowledge that
“some prominent courts have begun to expand the fiduciary

41. Id. at 1828.
42. See Studies Show Depth of Scandal in Churches, FREETHOUGHT TODAY, May 1990,
at 12, available at http://www.ffrf.org/timely/epidstudy.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
43. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1830–31.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1829–31.
46. Id. at 1834.
47. Id.
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obligations of religious organizations and their spokespersons.”48
However, rather than attempting to articulate a concrete basis for
asserting immunity to counteract this “trend,”49 Professors Lupu and
Tuttle caution that, to the extent courts use fiduciary duty, they
“must craft legally imposed duties in constitutionally sensitive
ways,”50 avoid using “religious character alone to trigger the
imposition of duties,”51 and clarify with “jury instructions . . .
carefully framed” to “warn against relying on an institution’s
religious character alone.”52 These are wise admonitions but provide
little concrete guidance to a court looking for a practical theory of
ecclesiastical immunity.
The second type of action discussed by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle is negligent hiring, training, and supervising. Although courts
have not allowed claims for negligent ordination to this point,53
some allow claims for negligent employment arguing that this has a
clear secular parallel.54 For this category of cases, Professors Lupu
and Tuttle make a creative and powerful suggestion of an
“alternative approach” between no immunity and absolute immunity
for churches.55 They suggest that churches and supervisors be liable
for negligent employment only if they have actual knowledge of or a
reckless disregard for the improper sexual proclivities of a
clergyman.56 Professors Lupu and Tuttle take this knowledge test
from the “actual malice” standard used in freedom of the press
cases.57 Further, they urge the adoption of procedural cautions, also
taken from the free press cases, such as requiring clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice,58 having judges assume

48. Id. at 1836.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1834.
51. Id. at 1844.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1846.
54. See id. at 147–48.
55. Id. at 1858–79.
56. See id. at 1795.
57. Id. at 1860 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (defining
actual malice as “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not”), and its progeny, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Hustler v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (allowing the press the freedom to perform duties without undue inhibition
from risks of liability)).
58. See id. at 1872.
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extraordinary control over juries,59 and limiting evidence of church
internal organization to written documents that can be interpreted in
secular terms.60 Professors Lupu and Tuttle then acknowledge that
even this approach may be inadequate in both a constitutional sense
and a practical sense.61
Professors Lupu and Tuttle last address respondeat superior or
vicarious liability.62 They conclude that, if a court does find the abuse
within the scope of agency using only neutral principles, then
“expansive interpretation of [the vicarious liability] test does not
raise special constitutional problems when applied to religious
organizations.”63 Because under Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
analysis tort claims for abuse against children are allowed,64 liability
in respondeat superior could thus follow for the organization in all
such cases. Further, if it cannot be proved that the perpetrator’s
counseling was purely spiritual, then many more cases may also lead
directly to liability in respondeat superior for the organization. Thus,
even if the other two bases for organization liability—breach of
fiduciary duty and negligent hiring, training, and supervising—are
not available, respondeat superior presents the possibility of
obtaining a judgment against a church as an organization much of
the time. Further, Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not suggest any
specific procedural or substantive protections or applications of
ecclesiastical immunity to avoid unconstitutional intrusion in cases
where courts apply broader interpretations of vicarious liability.
3. The limits of protection
Taken together, the kinds of tort cases for which Professors Lupu
and Tuttle offer some constitutional protection—other than merely
urging constitutional “sensitivity”—seem to be limited to two kinds
of cases. First, immunity is available in cases against individual
perpetrators involving adult victims who were abused in a
circumstance other than that of a professional (or comparable)
counseling setting, such as purely spiritual counseling, and who were

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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Id. at 1882.
See id. at 1797.
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not victims of criminal sexual acts. Second, immunity is available in
cases against religious institutions or supervisors alleging negligent
supervision, as long as there is no evidence that the defendant had
actual knowledge of, or a reckless disregard for, the perpetrator’s
propensities for sexual abuse. Thus, in terms of percentage of cases,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle provide little overall protection for clergy
and churches. Further, Professors Lupu and Tuttle offer a hearty
scheme of immunity only in the negligent supervision context,
leaving two other causes of action—fiduciary duty and vicarious
liability—largely available, through which a plaintiff may obtain the
same result. Their proposed immunity, finally, relies too much on
vague cautions about the need for courts to have constitutional
sensitivity.65
B. Difficulties with Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s Distinctions
In the preceding section, I focused on the limited nature of the
liability protections that Professors Lupu and Tuttle would provide
to clergy and churches. In this section, I argue further that the
distinctions upon which the limited exclusions rely are contestable. I
then conclude that, because of the fluidity of the standards, even
fewer cases than indicated in the above section are in fact protected
under Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s analysis. Moreover, the
immunity offered by Professors Lupu and Tuttle is further strained
by the risks of expanding judicial interpretations in the areas of
institutional fiduciary duty and vicarious liability.
65. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1797 (“[A]djudication of wrongful acts in
the hiring and supervision of clergy must be conducted with sensitivity to constitutional
concerns . . . .”); id. at 1819 (“[C]riminal investigations of, and plea negotiations with,
religious entities must be conducted with constitutional sensitivity to limits on the state’s role
in the selection and retention of clergy.”); id. at 1831 (“[J]udicial assessment of sexual
relationships between clergy and parishioners requires heightened sensitivity to the
constitutional problems inherent in such adjudications . . . .”); id. at 1834 (“[C]ourts must
craft legally imposed duties in constitutionally sensitive ways . . . .”); id. at 1847 (“[O]ther,
more constitutionally sensitive and precisely focused theories of relief can address the harms
about which the state has a legitimate concern . . . .”); id. at 1870 (“[A]djudication of
[certain] claims [must] be accompanied by constitutionally sensitive methods of deciding who
within a religious organization had authority to act in the requisite ways . . . .”); id. at 1878
(“[C]ourts may demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to [various issues].”); id. at 1871 (“[In
certain contexts] the reconsidered neutral principles doctrine would thus permit judges to
make the most constitutionally sensitive determinations on a motion for summary
judgment.”).
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1. The fuzziness of the distinctions with regard to the liability of
individual perpetrators
a. Distinction between adults and children. Professors Lupu and
Tuttle initially distinguish cases involving minors, arguing that the
“public interest in protecting children vastly outweighs any claim of
religious privilege; and . . . adjudication of the sexual abuse of
children can proceed without state intrusion into questions of
religious doctrine or governance.”66 With Professors Lupu and
Tuttle, I find the first assertion persuasive, although I am not sure
that every court would, as they say, “emphatically” agree.67 There are
certainly those who would argue that the preservation of religion
from government intrusion is the highest public interest.
The second assertion—“adjudication of the sexual abuse of
children can proceed without state intrusion into questions of
religious doctrine or governance”68—is more problematic. The
extent of state intrusion in child victim cases is less than in adult
victim cases only in the sense that it is not necessary to look at the
particulars of the relationship between the child and adult to
establish the basis of a perpetrator’s liability. Maintaining sexual
relations with a minor in the absence of marriage is a crime.69 If a
civil action is pursued against a perpetrator, the question of consent
is generally negated by age,70 and thus actions based in battery and
assault are available.71 In some jurisdictions, such cases are also
pursued as the torts of outrageousness, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or other less common torts.72 Therefore, courts
66. Id. at 1820.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1820 n.109.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(c) (1982) (providing that the
consent of a child is not a defense to rape even if the child was fully competent); see also
Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 58 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a person under the
statutory age of eighteen is not capable of consenting); Warrick v. State, 538 N.E.2d 952, 954
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a child is not capable of consenting to sexual acts); 70 AM.
JUR. 2D Seduction § 68 (1987) (negating consent of child).
71. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2000); Wilson v. Wilson,
742 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Brown, 602 S.E.2d 392, 397 (S.C. 2004).
72. See, e.g., Doe v. Ensey, 220 F.R.D. 422, 423–24 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2004)
(including claims for assault, battery, negligence, agency, and negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315
(Colo. 1996) (affirming trial court’s determination allowing claims against church and church
counselor for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring and supervision, outrageous conduct,
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can avoid trying to determine if trust and vulnerability with respect
to a perpetrator arose because of religious doctrine or governance.
However, if the family of a child victim seeks recovery from a
perpetrator’s supervisor or religious institution, questions of doctrine
and governance will usually play central roles in the litigation and the
same constitutional issues present themselves as with cases involving
adult victims. These include the same pressure on churches to
conform to governmental reshaping and the same potentially
unconstitutional probing. As discussed above,73 churches will
incorporate the courts’—and thus the government’s—conception of
proper institutional religious forms even if all cases involving adult
victims are barred.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle argue that “the public interest in
protecting children vastly outweighs any claim of religious
privilege.”74 Although for many purposes the law has drawn an
arbitrary line at age eighteen, it is nonetheless conceptually difficult
to distinguish the vulnerability of, and psychological damage to, a
seventeen-year-old versus an eighteen-year-old, especially one
struggling with substance addictions, a history of sexual exploitation,
or a troubled family.
b. Distinction between secular counseling and religious counseling.
In cases involving adult victims, Professors Lupu and Tuttle draw
further distinctions that are fraught with ambiguities. The first is the
line between secular counseling and spiritual counseling. If the abuse
arises in the course of secular or professional counseling sessions,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle—along with most courts—would find
the individual perpetrator liable, even if there were consent to the
sexual relationship.75 On the other hand, if the sexual relationship
arises out of purely spiritual or religious counseling, Professors Lupu
and Tuttle propose that the perpetrator should be able to assert

and vicarious liability); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 221 F.R.D. 564 (D. Kan. 2004)
(pleading claims for intentional failure to supervise, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
outrage, assault, and battery); Crawford v. Plumm, No. 03-2155-DJW, 2003 WL 22849183,
at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2003) (alleging childhood sexual abuse, assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy).
73. Supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
74. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1820.
75. See id. at 1820–22.
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ecclesiastical immunity.76 Thus, this distinction between spiritual and
secular becomes critical.
I am more than willing to concede that a person who is trained
and licensed as a psychotherapist—and who receives payment from
the patient for counseling—should be liable for having sex with his
patient, even if there were consent, whether or not the therapist is
also a member of the clergy. This liability arises from the application
of the professional rules governing licensed psychotherapists77 and
from some state statutes.78
But Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not draw this sharp of a line.
Initially, they suggest several characteristics of truly “secular”
counseling.79 I will call this List One. List One includes such
considerations as (1) using secular professional techniques, (2)
holding oneself out as a secular counselor, (3) publicly advertising,
(4) performing counseling in clinical settings, and (5) receiving
payment, by persons who (a) have undergone secular training and
licensure and (b) are qualified as counselors in a secular sense.80
Although I would draw the line at licensure, the tests in List One are
simple, fairly mechanical in application, and generally effective in
targeting cases in which liability is appropriate, notwithstanding the
possible ambiguity in defining some of the terms in this list such as
“qualified,” “advertising,” and “clinical settings.” So far, so good.

76. See id. at 1821 (“[C]lergy-specific triggers of liability offend constitutional norms
against disfavoring religion.”).
77. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND
CODE OF CONDUCT §§ 3.05, 10.05, 10.07–.08 (2002), available at http://www.apa.org/
ethics/code2002.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2004), applied in Elliott v. N.C. Psychology Bd.,
485 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. App. 1997); Roe v. Jefferson, No. 01-A-01-9212-CV-476, 1993 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 288 (Apr. 16, 1993). The professional standards of the American Association of
Pastoral Counselors assert a similar standard:
All forms of sexual behavior or harassment with clients are unethical, even
when a client invites or consents to such behavior or involvement. Sexual behavior is
defined as, but not limited to, all forms of overt and covert seductive speech,
gestures, and behavior as well as physical contact of a sexual nature; harassment is
defined as but not limited to, repeated comments, gestures or physical contacts of a
sexual nature.
AM. ASS’N OF PASTORAL COUNSELORS, CODE OF ETHICS, princ. III(g) (amended Apr. 28,
1994), at http://www.aapc.org/ethics.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 148A.03 (2003); Sexual Exploitation in Psychotherapy,
Professional Health Services, and Professional Mental Health Services Act, 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 140/1 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.41 (2004).
79. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1821–22.
80. See id. at 1822–23.
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However, Professors Lupu and Tuttle go further in
acknowledging that liability may follow a sexual relationship “when
the affair does not arise out of secular therapeutic counseling.”81 The
factors they suggest here I refer to as List Two.82 List Two includes
(1) holding a regular course of counseling sessions, (2) generating
information giving the counselor reason to know of the recipient’s
special circumstances of vulnerability, and (3) addressing “personal,
as opposed to entirely spiritual, matters.”83 The criteria in List Two
are far too broad and may risk encompassing almost all counseling
between a church member and her minister.
As to the first test in List Two (regular course of visits), if one is
struggling with a profound or ongoing religious or personal
problem, it is not unlikely that visits to the pastor may be fairly
regular over a period of time. Many persons who seek advice and
comfort from a religious leader do so more than once. Therefore,
nearly any significant counseling from a priest would meet this first
requirement.
The second test (knowledge of vulnerability) is far too broad.
Why would a person seek extended counseling with a cleric, who is
not otherwise a friend or co-worker, unless she is struggling with
some personal challenges? A member of a church might want to
explore the nuances of rabbinical law, the oneness of the Christian
godhead, or the implications of an existence before earth life. As
fascinating as those discussions may be, few of them go on for
session after session in a small, intimate setting of two. Discussions of
whether to join or stay in a particular church may be largely spiritual,
although the relative benefits of church activity to one’s personal life
and relationships are likely to arise at some point. A woman who
wishes to pursue litigation against a pastor and church will be
motivated to describe her situation as vulnerable because of family
stress, depression, substance abuse, and any number of vulnerabilities
for which psychological testimony may be obtained.
The third test (personal as opposed to entirely spiritual matters)
is particularly problematic, as there is no clear separation of
professional or secular from “entirely spiritual” counseling. Any
distinction that does exist collapses when these two types of

81. Id. at 1829.
82. See id. at 1831–32.
83. Id. at 1832.

1959

7PRE-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/13/2004 12:39 PM

[2004

counseling are interwoven in a single counseling session. The kind of
professional counseling Professors Lupu and Tuttle refer to as secular
is frequently one component mixed in with other kinds of
relationships. For instance, Professors Lupu and Tuttle acknowledge
that medical doctors are held liable for breach of fiduciary duty when
they engage in sex with a client after they have begun to offer
“therapeutic counseling.”84 Professors Lupu and Tuttle cite
McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman,85 in which the court stated it would
allow liability when a chiropractor gives “counsel or advice . . .
similar to that usually given by psychologists.”86 Presumably, the
health care providers in such cases also continue to render medical
services, so that the therapeutic counseling is just one aspect of the
relationship.
With other kinds of professionals, as with doctors, the main
purpose of a relationship can become laced with the kind of ancillary
sharing of personal information and obtaining of advice that is
common to secular counseling. For instance, I assume most
professionally trained psychotherapists, who are also clergy, offer
some religious counseling and some traditional secular therapy.
Presumably most clergy do not sharply separate the spiritual from the
temporal and would not be in the business of professional counseling
at all if there were no spiritual or religious component permitted.
Members of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors, for
instance, pledge to adhere to the concept that effective therapeutic
services combine theology with the behavioral sciences.87
On the other side of the coin, I assume that most religious
advisors who are not trained as psychotherapists offer some spiritual
counseling and some of the same kind of personal and relationship
advice that professional therapists offer. This interweaving of secular
and religious counseling seems analogous to medical doctors who
provide personal advice. The kind of sharing of information and
obtaining of advice that underlies transference may arise when the
spiritual slips toward the personal and relationship issues.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle cite Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley, in which the court comments that a clergy84. See id. at 1831.
85. 717 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1998).
86. Id. at 353; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1831.
87. See American Association of Pastoral Counselors, Pastoral Counseling: Brief History,
at http://www.aapc.org/history.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
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counselor should not be liable if the counseling is spiritual rather
than secular.88 The distinctions noted by the court are that the
church and the pastors (1) did not advertise as competent secular
therapists; and (2) offered instead “thickly religious counseling.”89
The court explained that the counseling was nonprofessional and the
defendants did not present themselves as “anything other than
pastoral counselors.”90 How “thick” must the mix be? And does
“advertising” require billboards and flyers? LDS Family Services does
not “advertise” as offering marriage counseling; Church members
are referred by Latter-day Saint bishops.91 Yet no one could
effectively argue that the therapists who work at LDS Family Services
do not offer traditional secular counseling (although no doubt
intermixed with the spiritual dimension).
Furthermore, Professors Lupu and Tuttle take inconsistent
stands on the line between professional and religious counseling. In
the last section of their paper, they argue that priests ought to be
entitled to the same privilege against reporting child sex abuse
accorded to lawyers, and that the seeking of legal counsel is
comparable to the seeking of spiritual counsel:
[T]he scope of the priest-penitent privilege is appropriately
compared with the scope of attorney-client privilege. The law
currently assures perpetrators of these (and other) crimes that they
may safely confide in their lawyers concerning their misdeeds . . . .
To permit the continuation of the attorney-client privilege for sex
offenders while denying a comparable priest-penitent privilege for
those same offenders is to create a secular advantage, favoring those
who seek advice about legal consequences and options over those
who seek spiritual advice concerning the same underlying
behavior.92

88. 763 P.2d 948, 960–61 (Cal. 1988).
89. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1823 (citing Nally, 763 P.2d at 950–52).
90. Nally, 763 P.2d at 954.
91. See The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Teach a Welfare Principle or
Topic, at http://providentliving.org/content/list/0,11664,5155-1,00.html (last visited Dec.
2, 2004); J. Richard Clarke, Ministering to Needs Through LDS Social Services, ENSIGN, May
1977, at 85, 89 (“The purpose or mission of LDS Social [now Family] Services is to assist
priesthood leaders by providing quality licensed and clinical services to members of the
Church.”).
92. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1892 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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They further argue that “victims of or witnesses to crimes of
sexual abuse should also have the same right to seek spiritual or legal
counsel, without fear of professional betrayal.”93 This statement
assumes that spiritual counseling is a “professional” function and
that the recipient of such counseling trusts spiritual counselors in the
same way as she might trust legal counselors.94
If the division of secular from spiritual counseling is specious, a
much broader grouping of claims against clergy for abuse of adults
will result in liability under Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s analysis.
The only clearly excluded cases are those in which (1) only pure
theology or church membership is discussed, and (2) the relationship
does not involve personal counseling. Noncounseling relationships,
such as purely social and casual interactions with clergy, are less likely
to give rise to sexual abuse because the parties are less likely to be
alone and less likely to be revealing personal information. Cases in
which the priest and parishioner are involved solely in planning a
social or organizing a choir would presumably survive under the
exemption from liability argued by Professors Lupu and Tuttle.
2. Flawed comparisons in noncounseling fiduciary duties
A second basis for finding clergy liable discussed by Professors
Lupu and Tuttle is fiduciary duty. Even if a priest is not involved in
counseling, some plaintiffs claim that he should be liable because
sexual contact is a breach of fiduciary duty. Professors Lupu and
Tuttle argue that, without evidence of the nature of the religious

93. Id. at 1893 (emphasis added).
94. Another risk of equating clergy with lawyers is institutional liability. Courts regularly
hold entire law firms liable for breach of fiduciary duty, although some law firms surely exceed
in size the practicing clergy of most churches. See Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An
Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413, 467 (1996) (noting the liability of a law firm is the
same as the liability of a partner). Liability is based on the notion that lawyers share files and
confidences about their clients’ cases and that they share an interest in the outcome of the
client’s case. See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in
the Practice of Law and Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 107–08 (2003). “Lawyers in a
firm . . . in fact normally function more or less as a single unit. They consult each other, have
access to each other’s files, overhear conversations with clients, and have a mutual financial
interest in their clients’ cases.” GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW
OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 324–25
(1990). The shared interest in the client’s case is partly financial but can also be a matter of
prestige, publicity, and other benefits of a good outcome. Efforts to draw comparisons
between clergy and lawyers risk increasing the threat of liability of clergy and at some point
equating churches with law firms.
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relationship, clergy cannot be characterized as the kind of fiduciary
who is liable for sexual relations with a parishioner.95 Indeed, in
some contexts, the existence of a fiduciary relation for other purposes
does not always make sexual relations a tort. As support, Professors
Lupu and Tuttle note that sex between a “stockbroker and client or
a trustee and beneficiary creates no greater legal liability than that
between any two adult strangers.”96
The comparison of clergy as fiduciaries to stockbrokers and the
like is not the most apt. Ultimately, we may agree that clergy cannot
be designated as fiduciaries without examining the religious
implications of their role. But if we assume that clergy are fiduciaries
of some kind, as Professors Lupu and Tuttle do in making this
argument, clergy cannot be shielded from liability based on the
comparison to financial trustees.
Most formal fiduciary duties are based on the entrustment of
property such as money or land.97 But in other cases, the “critical
resource” entrusted is “something valued by the beneficiary but not
ordinarily considered property—for example, the confidential
information shared by a client with an attorney.”98 With propertybased fiduciary relations, breach consists of misuse of the property.
With a physician, the breach of fiduciary duty may be misuse of
access to the body, either directly, as in improper touching in the
office, or indirectly, as in misprescribing medication.99 With
information-based and access-based fiduciary relations, breach

95. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1828.
96. Id. at 1829.
97. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1404 (2002).
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(“[A] physician's failure to disclose . . . interests [conflicting with the interests of the patient]
may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without informed consent
or breach of fiduciary duty.”); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 736 (Tenn. 1998)
(“[P]atients submit themselves to the skills and art, proficiency and expertise, of hospital
personnel . . . . [because] frequently, they have no real choice in the matter; they are physically
and intellectually unable to do much more than submit and rely upon the medical superiority
and ethical propriety of their attendants.” (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations to Actions § 90
(1987))); Joel Slawotsky, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Employer as Intermediary,
30 TORTS & INS. L.J. 1059, 1061 (1995) (“[A] doctor has a fiduciary duty to the patient. . . .
[in] evaluating the patient’s needs, assessing the risks and benefits of available drugs,
prescribing one, and supervising its use.’” (quoting Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d
87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980))).
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consists of the misuse of the information and the power to withhold
access.
With religious leaders, one kind of “critical resource” that may
be entrusted is personal information; another may be the willingness
to recognize the cleric as acting for the religion (or for God) or as
having power to grant or withhold benefits of religious access. That
information and power may be misused in the sense that the pastor
uses them to get inside the head of the parishioner for purposes of
seduction. Perhaps what is entrusted to the cleric can be more
accurately characterized as intimacy: sharing personal information,
self-exposure, and openness to direction and guidance. Initiating and
maintaining sexual relations would constitute an abuse of intimacy.
So, the fact that sex with one’s real estate agent or stockbroker is not
actionable is not particularly compelling in the clergy context. The
fact that stockbrokers are liable for misusing a client’s funds, but not
for sexual relationships, does not translate to immunizing clergy for
sexual relationships.
A more helpful comparison, perhaps, is the comparison
Professors Lupu and Tuttle make elsewhere between clergy and
lawyers.100 Although the American Bar Association has adopted a
Model Rule covering sex with clients,101 attorneys are subject to
professional discipline for having sexual relations with a client only if
the relevant state also has adopted the rule.102 Moreover, violation of
a Model Professional Rule is not necessarily grounds for a civil cause
of action.103 Where a state has no per se rule, courts look at the
characteristics of the client in terms of vulnerability and the words,
promises, and threats that passed between a lawyer and a client with
100. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1800.
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not have
sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when
the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”).
102. As of 1998, “[t]en states have adopted an express rule prohibiting attorney-client
sexual relations.” Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 131, 137
(1998). These states are California, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Utah. Id. at 137–48. Other states have “applied other
rules of conduct to prohibit attorney-client sexual relations” without actually expressly
prohibiting such relationships in the states’ rules of professional conduct. Id. at 148. These
states include Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas. Id. at
149–64; see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Ethics 2000 Review Status Chart, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 20.
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whom the lawyer had a sexual relationship to determine whether the
sexual conduct gives rise to liability.104 For instance, in one New
Hampshire case, the attorney was found liable where he knew that
his client “suffered from emotional problems and that she was seeing
a psychiatrist.”105 A court in Colorado ruled that a client’s pending
divorce made her “particularly vulnerable at the time of his
misconduct, which is also an aggravating factor.”106 An Indiana court
referred to the vulnerability of clients who are “troubled or
emotionally fragile.”107
The liability shield for clergy argued by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle, then, erodes when the comparison is made, as is appropriate,
between lawyers and clergy, rather than between stockbrokers and
clergy. What the comparison to lawyers suggests is that the lawyer—
and thus the cleric—as a fiduciary, may be liable for engaging in sex
with a client based on evidence of the client’s unique vulnerabilities
and the actual conversations between the parties. This inquiry into
the characteristics of the congregant and the actual words exchanged
between them arguably does not require the constitutionally
improper judicial determination of the “‘true’ theological meaning
of a clergy-congregant relationship” feared by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle.108 It follows then that another tenet of Professors Lupu and
Tuttle’s scheme of constitutional immunity falters with the
unraveling of the comparison between clergy and property-based
fiduciaries.
104. See, e.g., People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808, 809 (Colo. 1991) (“[A]s a factor in
aggravation, we find that the [client] was especially vulnerable at the time [of the sexual
relations].”); Comm. on Prof.’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1989)
(finding that an attorney engaging in sex with a client who was unstable violated the attorney’s
professional oath to maintain his fitness to represent and to “inspire confidence, respect and
trust of his client and the public”); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Heard, 963 P.2d
818, 821, 825 (Wash. 1998) (“Despite the absence of an express rule banning attorney-client
sexual relations, an attorney’s sexual relations with a client can constitute ‘moral turpitude,’
justifying the imposition of disciplinary sanctions,” especially where attorney knew client was
vulnerable.); Musick v. Musick, 453 S.E.2d 361, 365 (W. Va. 1994) (“The ABA
Committee . . . observed that the attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary one and that a
lawyer’s fiduciary obligation is heightened if the client is emotionally vulnerable.”). Cf. In re
DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71 (La. 2004) (suspending an attorney for a violation of conflict of
interest, fiduciary duty, and public trust in justice where the attorney engaged in consensual
sexual relations with a client who was found not especially vulnerable nor threatened).
105. Drucker’s Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1202 (N.H. 1990).
106. People v. Barr, 929 P. 2d 1325, 1326 (Colo. 1996).
107. In re Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ind. 1996).
108. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1827.
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3. Liability of supervisors and religious institutions
After addressing the liability of individual clerics, Professors Lupu
and Tuttle move on to the potential claims against organizations and
supervisors. They discuss three possible theories of liability: negligent
employment, respondeat superior, and institutional fiduciary duty.109
With regard to the negligent employment theory, I concur that
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s suggestions for applying an “actual
knowledge” or reckless disregard approach to these cases is a useful
new construct for shielding churches from improper intrusions.
Thus, I do not address that theory in detail here. Instead, I focus on
respondeat superior and institutional fiduciary duty. I conclude that
the exposure of churches and supervisors under these theories may
be underestimated by Professors Lupu and Tuttle, and that courts—
fueled with increasing antipathy toward churches and heightened
awareness of abuse—may move toward broader interpretations of the
law. If so, the effectiveness of the normative vision offered by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle becomes even more strained.
a. Respondeat superior. Although respondeat superior has not
proven to be a very fruitful theory for plaintiffs to date,110 there are
indications that courts may be moving toward more liberally
applying it against churches. While I, along with Professors Lupu
and Tuttle, may not agree with the broad interpretation of agency
used by some courts, one must acknowledge that liberal arguments
exist and are occasionally adopted, potentially leaving churches
exposed. Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not articulate a form of
immunity to apply in these cases, other than suggestions on how to
determine who the principal is. Thus, if—as some have suggested—
vicarious liability is a still-developing field of law,111 greater
accessibility of judgments using this theory will make the immunity
Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest for other theories less important.
Liability sounding in respondeat superior is dependant on the
validity of the underlying tort against the perpetrator clergyman and
the willingness of the court to find the employee’s actions within the

109. See id. at 1834.
110. See id. at 1879–80.
111. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
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scope of his duties for the employer.112 While many courts have
historically adopted the position that sexual conduct is outside the
scope of employment,113 a substantial minority of courts have
disagreed.114 Professors Lupu and Tuttle recognize that “[t]he
112. A mere agent does not create respondeat superior liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1958). The following factors are to be taken into consideration
when determining whether an agency relationship qualifies as a master-servant relationship:
extent of control the employer has over the details the actor’s work, whether it is a distinct
occupation, whether the actor is under direction of the employer or is without supervision,
whether and what skills are required, whether the workman or the employer provides the tools
and location required for the work, the length of time of employment, the method of payment
(whether on a time basis or per job completed), whether the work is part of the regular
business of the employer, the parties’ beliefs about the relationship, and whether the principal
is or is not in business. See id. § 220. Essentially the line is the same as between an employee
and an independent contractor. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1883 n.350 (citing
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 15-A, EMPLOYER’S
SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE 5 (2004)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225
(providing that consideration is not necessary to the relationship of master and servant nor
principal and agent). For discussion of whether not being paid matters in the case of Latter-day
Saint clergy, see supra text accompanying notes 68–69.
113. See, e.g., Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
that a priest’s improper sexual activity with a parishioner was not typical of clergy behavior and
not foreseeable and therefore barring a respondeat superior claim), rev. denied, 48 Cal. 3d 448
(1987); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1998) (holding that the sexual
involvement of a priest is per se outside the scope of employment and therefore barring
respondeat superior); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592, 599 & n.30 (Okla. 1999)
(noting that in a substantial majority of cases, sexual abuse was found to be outside the scope
of employment); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Grahmann, 133 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. App.
2004) (“[A]s a matter of law, [the defendant priest] was not acting within the scope of his
duties as an employee or priest on behalf of the Diocese when he allegedly sexually molested
Doe.”).
114. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Washington law) (holding that acts of an employee counselor in engaging in sexual conduct
with a counselee were within the scope of employment); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 81
n.20 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (“A claim for negligent supervision may arise when an employer
knew or should have known that an employee’s conduct would subject third parties to an
unreasonable risk of harm.” (citing Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993)));
Gammons v. N.C. Dep’t. of Human Res., 472 S.E.2d 722, 726 (N.C. 1996) (stating that
vicarious liability arises from supervision and control); Bray v. Am. Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 988
P.2d 933, 935 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (determining that the focus should not have been on the
act that caused the injury but rather on the acts within the scope of employment that led to the
acts that caused the injury).
Some courts have held that secular applications of vicarious liability can be used against
churches without violating the First Amendment as long as religious procedures or beliefs are
not interpreted or weighed. See, e.g., Moses, 863 P.2d at 313, 314, 320, 321 (dictum)
(allowing a claim of vicarious liability against a diocese for harm to a parishioner based on a
sexual relationship between the parishioner and a priest during the course of counseling as long
as religious doctrine is not interpreted or weighed); see also Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d
1027, 1074–78 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (allowing a claim of respondeat superior against a church
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employer may be liable even when the alleged wrong, such as sexual
abuse, occurs outside the scope of the agent’s employment but
nevertheless is facilitated by the employment relationship.”115
Some courts argue that the doctrine of respondeat superior
would not be useful if the scope of agency included only those
actions that were done solely with the best interests of the employer
in mind.116 As one commentator remarked, “[e]mployers rarely
employ workers for the purpose of engaging in wrongful acts.
Delivery drivers are instructed to drive carefully, yet their negligent,
reckless, or even intentionally injurious driving is attributed to their
employer.”117
Professors Lupu and Tuttle reason that, if a plaintiff argues that
sexual abuse “represents a breach of the cleric’s fiduciary
obligations,” then the “plaintiff at least implicitly claims that the
when plaintiff alleges a clergyman’s sexual misconduct with a parishioner took place during
normal business hours in the course of his normal duties and such conduct was reasonably
foreseeable by the church because of the cleric’s known history of sexual misconduct); Bear
Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996) (allowing a minor’s
vicarious liability tort claims against a church for a pastor’s inappropriate touching during a
counseling relationship); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 352, 365 (Fla. 2002) (finding that
the Establishment Clause does not bar a cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision by
parishioners against a church and archdiocese where parishioners were allegedly sexually
assaulted by a priest during the time they were working at church); Fearing v. Bucher, 977
P.2d 1163, 1166–69 (Or. 1999) (granting a vicarious liability claim against a diocese because
the jury could reasonably infer that a priest’s sexual assaults against a minor parishioner were a
direct outgrowth of trust engendered in the priest and were committed out of the priest’s
desire, at least partially and initially, to fulfill his employment duties as youth pastor and priest);
Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the plaintiff.’s
complaint sufficiently states a claim of vicarious liability against a church because the alleged
sexual seduction was an improper performance of pastoral counseling duties). See generally
Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of
Clergy, 5 A.L.R.5th 530, § 3 (2004).
115. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1800; see also id. at 1881 nn.341–43 (citing Doe v.
Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990); Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d
1377, 1381 (Conn. 1997); Nelligan v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, No.
CV0200992185, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 476 (Mar. 5, 2004)). But see Mark E. Chopko,
The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1089,
1113–14 (finding this expansive view improper and arguing that “[t]he better view is that
criminal impulsive and abusive behavior, contrary to religious teaching and law, is not even
remotely in the service of the religion.”).
116. See, e.g., Veco v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 924 n.36 (Alaska 1999) (clarifying that
the employee’s act needs to be motivated “at least to some degree to serve the master’s
business”).
117. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 138
(1995).
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clergyman has put his own desires above his professional
responsibilities,”118 and thus acts outside of the scope of agency.
However, this argument suggests that any conduct by an employee
that is a breach of his duty to his employer is per se outside the scope
of employment for vicarious liability purposes. Most employers
intend that their employees not commit torts or breaches of contract
or other action that gives rise to liability; nonetheless, when the
employee does these things, it can be both a breach of the
employee’s duty to the employer and a basis for finding the employer
liable in respondeat superior.119 While “it is less likely that a willful
tort will be properly held to be in the course of employment,”120 it is
not impossible. The Supreme Court in Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth.121 acknowledges both that: “The [sexually] harassing
supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and
even antithetical to the objectives of the employer”;122 but “[t]he
concept of scope of employment has not always been construed to
require a motive to serve the employer.”123
Some courts adopt an even broader interpretation. They find
vicarious liability for employee misconduct by conceptualizing the
injurious actions, although not expressly authorized, to be the
“culmination” of ordinary and authorized duties124 or done “in

118. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1880.
119. See Hurlow v. Managing Partners, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 1158, 1161–62 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001)(“[E]ven if an employee ‘violates the employer's rules, orders, or instructions, or engages
in expressly forbidden actions,’ the employer will still be held accountable as long as the
employee was acting within the scope of employment.” (quoting Warner Trucking, Inc. v.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 1997)); Greene v. St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co., 320 P.2d 311, 314 (Wash. 1958) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
an employer may, under certain circumstances, be held liable for the negligent act of his
employee, although such act may be contrary to his instructions.”).
120. W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505
(5th ed. 1984).
121. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). For discussion of this and its companion case, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and
Employment Law in Two Transitional Decades, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 495, 519 (2004); Paula J.
Dalley, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment, 104 W. VA.
L. REV. 517 (2002). For discussion of vicarious liability for sexual harassment in general, see
Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private
Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 149 (2003).
122. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 757.
123. Id.
124. Laurim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Or. 1999) (addressing sexual abuse by a
Boy Scout leader).
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conjunction” with authorized acts.125 Indeed, the Restatement allows
vicarious liability for acts where “the servant . . . was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”126
Some courts also find vicarious liability if the harmful acts were done
in approximately the same time and place as the employment.127
Some courts have described the concept of “scope of
employment” as targeting acts that are “reasonably foreseen” from
the nature of authorized duties.128 Recently, the Connecticut
Superior Court, in Nelligan v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese,129
declared that because of the revelations of the commonality of clergy
abuse in the last nine years, “[t]his court, at least, is not prepared to
conclude that an activity which might be undertaken by as many as
four percent of an employer’s employees is a clear cut ‘digression
from duty’ as a matter of law.”130
Professors Lupu and Tuttle offer no clear proposal for protecting
churches from vicarious liability based on these arguments if the
underlying acts are found to be breaches of fiduciary duty. Their
proposals to restrict liability under both negligent employment and
direct institutional fiduciary duty may be monumental, but churches
need more protection than that offered by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle in the area of vicarious liability.
b. Institutional fiduciary duty. Further, Professors Lupu and
Tuttle may underestimate the risk of finding an institutional fiduciary
duty on the part of religious organizations. They describe
institutional fiduciary duty liability as liability based on a failure to
investigate, to warn, or to take remedial action in response to
allegations of sexual abuse, rather than as liability based on a close,

125. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Washington state law).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at
802 (concluding that this second half of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement is not
superfluous).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (noting that an act is not
covered if it is “far beyond the authorized time or space limits” of the servant’s authority).
128. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311
n.3 (Minn. 1983); see also Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Cobb, 45 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931).
129. No. CV0200992185, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 476 (Mar. 5, 2004).
130. Id. at *6.
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personal relationship typical of many fiduciary relationships.131 They
indicate that no such liability would be proper in the case of religious
organizations, for several reasons. For example, they assert that an
individual would have no reason to think that the church looks out
for her interest rather than itself, especially if the church is large and
bureaucratic.132 Professors Lupu and Tuttle also argue that there is
no clear counterpart to secular organizations.133
However, an organization, institution, firm, or other entity (no
matter how big and bureaucratic) can theoretically have—and be
found liable for breaching—a fiduciary duty, just as an organization
can be found guilty of a crime.134 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
“fiduciary relationship” as one in which “one person is under a duty
to act for the benefit of the other on matters within the scope of the
relationship.”135 Black’s then defines “person” as either a human
being or an entity.136 Of course, any legal entity, other than an
individual, can exist only through the conduct of individual officers
and members. Consequently, most criminal statutes and fiduciary
duty cases target the individuals who are at fault. But conceptually, if
an individual with power to act on behalf of the institution commits
a breach of fiduciary duty, the institution may become liable. It is
not uncommon for courts to find a breach of fiduciary duty by
brokers and securities firms,137 escrow companies,138 and title
companies.139
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1834.
See id. at 1834–35.
See id. at 1844.
See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 2002); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909) (determining corporations could be held criminally responsible); United States v.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287 (D. Mass 1994) (reaffirming that corporations are
criminally responsible); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305 (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
20.20(2)(b) (McKinney 1998). See also other state statutes cited in Laura Russell, Note,
Pursuing Criminal Liability for the Church and Its Decision Makers for Their Role in Priest
Sexual Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 903 n.173 (2003).
135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1982).
136. BLACK’S, supra note 135, at 1162.
137. See, e.g., Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003) (identifying a firm as a
fiduciary to customers); Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 906 F.2d 1206,
1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming jury instructions stating that the relationship between a
licensed broker and its customers is fiduciary); Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.,
650 F.2d 817, 819 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding a lower court’s finding of breach of fiduciary
duty by a brokerage firm); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45, 47 (2d Cir.
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It is true that most of the kinds of fiduciary duties imposed on
entities are established, formal duties. However, in a few cases the
formal, historical, statutory limitations on institutional fiduciary
duties drift toward informal, recently developed, court-based
fiduciary duties. For instance, some courts have found insurance
companies to be fiduciaries, although the circumstances creating the
duties and the extent of those duties vary widely. 140 However, other
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (applying federal securities law) (holding a broker
as fiduciary to an investor); Stanton v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 100,
104 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (determining a brokerage firm to have a direct fiduciary duty to a client);
see also Cheryl Goss Weis, A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-Dealer Liability for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65, 94 (1997) (“[A] firm acting as a fiduciary is
required in all cases to ensure that the customer understands when the firm is selling its own
securities.” (citing Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949))).
138. See, e.g., Delson Lumber Co. v. Wash. Escrow Co., 558 P.2d 832, 834 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976) (“An escrow holder occupies a fiduciary relationship to all parties to the escrow
and owes the same duty of fidelity that an agent or trustee owes to its principal.” (citation
omitted)).
139. See, e.g., Buffington v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 546 P.2d 366, 368 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976) (“[A]n escrow agent acts in a fiduciary capacity and must conduct the affairs with which
he is entrusted with scrupulous honesty, skill and diligence.” (citations omitted)); Colonial Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (“An
escrow holder is the agent of all the parties to the escrow at all times prior to performance of
the conditions of the escrow; bears a fiduciary relationship to each of them; and owes an
obligation to each measured by an application of the ordinary principles of agency.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spaziani v. Millar, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 682
(Cal. Ct. App. 1963))); Hurst v. Enterprise Title Agency, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 689, 697–98
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (dictum) (finding an “escrow agent owes parties a fiduciary duty ‘to
carry out the terms of the agreement as intended by the parties’” (citation omitted)); Denaxas
v. Sandstone Court of Bellevue L.L.C., 63 P.3d 125, 129 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he escrow agent,
as fiduciary to all parties to the escrow ‘must conduct the affairs with which [it] is entrusted
with scrupulous honesty, skill, and diligence.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l
Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (Wash. 1973))).
140. Some courts have held that insurers are per se fiduciaries. See Fraioli v. Metropolitan
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 748 A.2d 273, 275 (R.I. 2000) (“[A]n insurance company has a
fiduciary obligation to act in the ‘best interests of its insured . . . [and to] refrain from acts that
demonstrate greater concern for the insurer’s monetary interest than the financial risk
attendant to the insured’s situation.’” (second alteration in the original) (quoting Asermely v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999))); McGreevy v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 904 P.2d
731, 736 (Wash. 1995) (finding that the fiduciary relationship between insurer and insured
“exists not only as a result of the contract between insurer and insured, but because of the high
stakes involved for both parties to an insurance contract and the elevated level of trust
underlying insureds’ dependence on their insurers”). Other courts have held that a fiduciary
relationship between insurers and their insureds is created only when there is a special
relationship that goes beyond ordinary business dealings. See Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 951, 959 (D. Minn. 2000) (“[T]here is no per se rule precluding the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between an insurer and its insureds.” Minnesota requires
insured and insurer to have a special relationship beyond ordinary “arm’s length” business
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courts have found that insurance companies are not per se
fiduciaries.141 A few courts have found that the hospital-patient
relationship is a fiduciary one.142 They hold that, although one

dealings where “confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and
influence on the other.” (citation omitted) (quoting Stark v. Equitable Life Assurance Co.,
285 N.W. 466, 470 (Minn. 1939))); cf. In re Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co. Premium Litigation,
107 F. Supp. 2d 841, 863–64 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“As a general rule in [Ohio and Arizona],
the relationship between an insurance company and its insured is not inherently fiduciary in
nature.” However, Ohio recognizes a fiduciary relationship “only if both parties understand
that a special trust or confidence has been reposed.” While in Arizona “although an insurance
company is not a fiduciary to its insured, it may have some duties of a fiduciary nature, such as
duties to treat the insured honestly and fairly.” (citations omitted)). Some courts have held
that insurers are fiduciaries only with respect to certain, specific responsibilities within their
relationship with insureds. See McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 864, 867–68 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (analyzing the difference between first-party and third-party bad faith
actions where the former consists of an adversarial, nonfiduciary relationship between an
insured victim of tort and his insurance company claiming benefits under his own policy, i.e.,
due to tortfeasor’s insolvency, and the latter consists of a fiduciary relationship between an
insured tortfeasor and tortfeasor’s insurance company where the complete control that
tortfeasor’s insurance company has over litigation and settlement “places an insurance
company in a fiduciary relationship with its insured”); Cash v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
528 S.E.2d 372, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), aff’d, 538 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 2000) (finding a
fiduciary duty to keep an insured informed as to insurance coverage, but not “with respect to
settlement of claims”).
141. Several courts have held that insurers are not true fiduciaries, although they may
have duties that are akin to duties owed by fiduciaries. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 246, 251−53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he insurer’s obligations attendant to its duty of
good faith are heightened. . . . Such obligations have been characterized as akin to fiduciarytype responsibilities . . . . While these ‘special’ duties are akin to, and often resemble, duties
which are also owed by fiduciaries, the fiduciary-like duties arise because of the unique nature
of the insurance contract, not because an insurer is a fiduciary.” (citation omitted)); Powers v.
United Servs. Auto Ass’n., 979 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Nev. 1999) (“The duty owed by an
insurance company to an insured is fiduciary in nature. . . . This special relationship exists in
part because, as insurers are well aware, consumers contract for insurance to gain protection,
peace of mind and security against calamity. . . . An insurer’s duty to its policyholder is . . .
‘akin’ to a fiduciary relationship.”); Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 574,
578 (Wash. 2001) (“A quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an insurer and its insured.
An insurer has an enhanced fiduciary obligation that rises to a level higher than that of mere
honesty and lawfulness of purpose. It requires an insurer to deal fairly with an insured, giving
equal consideration in all matters to the insured’s interests as well as its own.” (citation
omitted)).
142. See, e.g., Keithley v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 698 P.2d 435, 439 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that a hospital has a fiduciary duty to disclose medical information to patients);
Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 736 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that a hospital-patient
relationship is fiduciary because patients must “rely upon the medical superiority and ethical
propriety of” the hospital personnel (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garcia v.
Presbyterian Hosp. Ctr., 593 P.2d 487, 489−90 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979))); Atienza v. Taub,
239 Cal. Rptr. 454, 458 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that sexual relations between a
doctor and patient during the course of treatment constitutes breach of fiduciary duty only
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individual health professional commits the breach, the institution is
responsible. In a small number of cases, courts have found other
entities that are not per se fiduciaries, such as lenders143 or
universities,144 to have fiduciary duties in certain, limited
circumstances.

when it is represented or actually is a modality of treatment); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 1, at 1800 n.34 (citing Scott M. Puglise, Note, “Calling Dr. Love”: The Physician-Patient
Sexual Relationship as Grounds for Medical Malpractice—Society Pays While the Doctor and
Patient Play, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 321 (1999/2000) (discussing the malpractice liability of
physicians who engage in sexual relationships with patients)); cf. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary
Bd., 818 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1991) (finding that a doctor’s sexual relations with a sixteen-yearold patient constituted moral turpitude for breaching trust where patient was extremely
vulnerable). See generally STEVEN B. BISBING ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE BY PROFESSIONALS: A
LEGAL GUIDE 216–19 (1995).
143. See, e.g., Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“The
relationship of a bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary.”)); Denison State Bank v Madeira,
640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982) (acknowledging conditions when fiduciary relationship
might arise for banks); Dugan v. First Nat’l Bank, 606 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Kan. 1980) (dictum)
(“The existence of a fiduciary relationship between a bank and a customer has arisen under
unusual circumstances; usually, the bank had dealt directly with the customer regarding the
matters involved in the litigation, and the bank had knowledge of the reliance and confidence
of the customer; in some instances the bank stood to profit from non-disclosure to the
customer.”); Smith v. Saginaw Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 288 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Mich. Ct. App.
1979) (finding a fiduciary relationship between a bank and depositor where the depositor
reposed faith, confidence, and trust on the bank and heavily relied on the judgment and advice
of the bank); Klein v. First Edina Nat’l Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1972) (dictum)
(“[W]hen a bank transacts business with a depositor or other customer, it has no special duty
to counsel the customer and inform him of every material fact relating to the transaction—
including the bank’s motive, if material, for participating in the transaction—unless special
circumstances exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason to know that the customer is
placing his trust and confidence in the bank and is relying on the bank so to counsel and
inform him.”); see also Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty
and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 740–741 (1994); Steven
C. Koppel et al., Lenders Beware: New Potential Liability in the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 5
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 281, 281 (1996). See generally Niels B.
Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 21, 99 (1992).
144. See Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97–98 (D. Conn. 2000) (“Given the
collaborative nature of the relationship between a graduate student and a dissertation advisor
who necessarily shares the same academic interests, the Court can envision a situation in which
a graduate school, knowing the nature of this relationship, may assume a fiduciary duty to the
student.” In determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists a court may look at whether
the university “represented that it would safeguard its students from faculty misconduct[,] . . .
[the university’s] representation of its mission towards graduate students, and whether or not it
represented that it would take care of graduate students to the exclusion of all others.”);
Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999) (finding that a
postsecondary institution has a fiduciary duty to its students to create a safe environment free
of sexual advances by faculty to whom students are vulnerable because a “power differential
between faculty and students” exists (citation omitted)).
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Although these loose, expansive applications of fiduciary duty
law are largely undisciplined and unwarranted, they do happen.
Churches should not be found to have fiduciary duties as institutions
because such a broad application of the forever fluid law of fiduciary
duties leaves them open to too much risk. This risk is insufficiently
addressed by Professors Lupu and Tuttle, who offer no concrete
proposal for handling the resulting constitutional concerns. Thus,
even if respondeat superior were not available as a cause of action,
under the framework proposed by Professors Lupu and Tuttle, a
plaintiff might still successfully characterize a claim against a church
as a breach of fiduciary duty. The knowledge limitation suggested by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle for use in negligent hiring, training, and
supervising cases is insufficient to provide adequate ecclesiastical
immunity in the breach-of-fiduciary-duty setting.
III. PROFESSORS LUPU AND TUTTLE’S STANDARDS AND THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
Legal arguments suffer in abstraction. Understanding the
arguments made by Professors Lupu and Tuttle may be facilitated by
applying their standards in a context-specific way. I am naturally
most interested in how the law plays out when applied to The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”), of which
I am a member. In this Part, I work through Professor Lupu and
Tuttle’s categories and immunities in this context. I conclude that
the categories and explanations offered by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle are useful, although in some ways insufficient, to tease apart
those cases in which liability is proper from those cases in which
ecclesiastical immunity would be proper. I argue that the application
of the theories of liability discussed by Professors Lupu and Tuttle to
the Church raises the specter of a plethora of fact-, context-, and
liturgy-specific issues, such as would require the help of an insider to
decipher. However, if a court were willing to engage in factual
inquiry concerning the organization and principles of the Church,
the distinctions described by Professors Lupu and Tuttle are
insufficient to protect it from inappropriate and unconstitutional
liability.
In Part III, I assume that the victim is an adult female because
there is little evidence of sexual abuse of adult males.145 I also assume
145. See supra note 16.
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that a case brought by the victim, rather than one brought by her
husband under a theory such as alienation of affections, which, by
the way, is still a viable claim in Utah.146 I also assume, as discussed
in the next section, that all Latter-day Saint clergy are male.147
A. Who Are Latter-day Saint Clergy?
Unlike many other churches, the question of who qualifies as
clergy is complex. Virtually every active adult member of the Church
has a “calling” to perform some task in furtherance of the Church’s
mission, from sunday school teacher to scoutmaster.148 It would be
unreasonable to consider every one of them clergy for purposes of
sexual abuse liability.
Those who hold Church offices, including high-level
administrative and authoritative positions, are lay.149 The vast
majority of them have no theological training150 and hold office for a
limited time (many callings are for one to five years) during which
they continue to pursue their professional and familial
responsibilities.151 Although they are lay, some of them function in
many ways similar to the professional clergy in other religions.
146. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah 1983) (ruling that an
action for alienation of affections is still a viable cause of action in Utah “on the premise that
each spouse has a valuable interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy,
companionship, support, duties, and affection” (quoting Note, The Case for Retention of
Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 426, 430–31 (1972)); Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1393 (Utah 1995) (citing
Nelson favorably on the issue of alienation of affections). Utah is the state with the largest
concentration of members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
147. While women also have nonpriesthood administrative callings, such as president of
the Young Women’s auxiliary or of the all-female Relief Society, there are few circumstances
that might involve a close working relationship between a man and a female leader or coworker because of gender segregation in most of the auxiliaries.
148. See generally Brian L. Pitcher, Callings, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 249,
249 (Daniel H. Ludlow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA] (“Committed Latterday Saints accept and fulfill one or more callings at any given time.”).
149. See generally Paul H. Thompson, Lay Participation and Leadership, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 814.
150. See Bruce Douglas Porter, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 276, 279 (“Formal training is not required for holding
positions in the Church, nor is there a ministerial career track of any kind.”).
151. See Don M. Pearson, Bishop, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 117, 117 (“A
bishop is a lay minister and receives no monetary compensation for his services. Like other
local Church officers, he must maintain himself and his family through normal employment.”);
see also Boyd K. Packer, The Bishop and His Counselors, ENSIGN, May 1999, at 57, 58 (“The
bishopric must have time to make a living and time for their own families.”).
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However, determining which do and which do not function like
clergy requires knowledge of the organization of the Church.
All leaders with high-level callings are ordained to the
priesthood. However, the concept of clergy with respect to the
Church certainly cannot reasonably be deemed to include every
person who is ordained to the priesthood. All worthy males age
twelve or older may be ordained to the priesthood. Most advance
through offices of the priesthood, and at middle-age most adult
males who have been active in the Church for some time are
ordained high priests.152 Finding all priesthood holders, or even all
high priests, to have potential liability as clergy would place an
enormous and unprecedented burden on members of the Church.
While all priesthood holders are given, with ordination, some
general responsibilities and privileges to bless and serve, the powers
of administration and stewardship over specific members are reserved
for those who hold particular “callings.” Only a very few men in any
local congregation have responsibilities similar to the clergy in other
religions.
The responsible authority for a local congregation, or “ward,” is
a bishop.153 He reports to a stake president,154 who has authority
over ten or so wards. Stake presidents report to Church general
authorities and to those who may be assigned by general authorities
to assist with Church work in a particular area. They report to the
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles and the First Presidency of the
Church, all of whom hold their positions for life. All of these
positions entail sufficient authority to qualify their holders as clergy.

152. See A.L. Richards, High Priest, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 587, 587–
88 (“As of 1989, there were approximately 246,000 high priests in the Church.”); see also 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, app. 13, at 1756 (reporting 1991 membership numbers
equaling 7,762,000); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Newsroom “Facts and
Figures,” at http://www.lds.org/newsroom (last visited Dec. 2, 2004) (showing Church
membership as of December 31, 2003, to be 11,985,254). According to these numbers, a
current high priest approximation would total 386,571.
153. In small congregations, the presiding officer is a “branch president” rather than a
bishop. To avoid confusion, I will use the term “bishop” to include both. Moreover, a bishop
has two counselors to which various duties may be delegated, including interviews with
members. Rather than create unnecessary complexity, for this paper, I will use the collective
term “bishop” as including the bishop and his counselors.
154. Like a bishop, a stake president has two counselors to whom various duties may be
delegated, including interviews with members. Rather than create unnecessary complexity, for
this paper, I will use the term “stake president” to include the stake president and his
counselors.
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Most of the religious counseling and personal, one-on-one
interaction in the Church involves a member and her bishop or stake
president. Bishops hold the positions for approximately five years,
stake presidents for approximately ten. Individual members rarely, if
ever, interact on a personal basis with anyone higher in the line of
authority than his or her stake president. Although members of the
Church may, for various personal and administrative purposes, seek
advice from and report to other leaders, such as Relief Society
presidents and priesthood quorum presidents, these leaders have
limited authority and must defer any serious or long-term issue to
the appropriate bishop. Thus, bishops, stake presidents, and those
authorities to whom they report may be analogized to the clergy of
other faiths.
Another category of religious leader that may arguably be
considered clergy in the context of the Church is that of
missionaries. Even if full-time missionaries may in some sense
function like clergy, I argue below that they should rarely be found
liable for breach of fiduciary duty or misconduct in counseling.
In Section B, I will first apply Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
standards to nonmissionary leaders in the Church and then to fulltime missionaries. In Section C, I will consider issues of institutional
liability, as raised by Professors Lupu and Tuttle, in the context of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
B. Finding Liability Against Alleged Perpetrators in The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
1. Bishops and stake presidents
a. Counseling. With respect to the liability of individual
perpetrators, the first issue to address from Professors Lupu and
Tuttle’s article is the line between secular and spiritual counseling.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle admit that clergy engaged in
professional, secular counseling should be held liable for breach of a
fiduciary duty for having sexual relations with a counselee. On the
other hand, they would shield the perpetrator/clergyman if the
relationship did not arise in the course of professional or
professional-like counseling.
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The most common counseling situations in the Church arise
between a member and her bishop or stake president.155 As is natural
with a lay priesthood, a small representative cross-section of the
acting bishops and stake presidents are, coincidentally, licensed
psychologists, psychiatrists, or therapists by profession.156 But for the
vast majority of bishops and stake presidents—who are not also
employed as secular counselors—application of the tests from
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s List One157 appropriately excludes
them from liability. First, if these bishops or stake presidents use
“professional techniques,” it is only by chance. Bishops and stake
presidents do not hold themselves out as secular counselors nor do
they publicly advertise. A particular bishop or stake president may
offer to help a member who comes to him with a personal problem,
but to the extent a leader solicits visits from members it is not under
the guise of offering secular counseling. Moreover, bishops and stake
presidents meet with members in the leader’s offices at church
buildings, or occasionally at homes, but not in clinical settings.
Bishops and stake presidents do not receive pay, either as counselors
from the parishioner or as clergy from the Church. Bishops and stake
presidents have not undergone secular training and are not qualified
as secular counselors. Bishops and stake presidents attend only an

155. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, like many other religious
organizations, sponsors an organization that employs psychologists, psychiatrists, therapists,
and social workers. LDS Family Services provides general counseling (which requires
membership in the Church and referral from one’s bishop) and adoption services (which do
not require Church membership). LDS Family Services counselors must have at least a master’s
degree in an area of behavioral science. The most common degree is social work, but some
have degrees in marriage and family therapy. See The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Counseling Services, at http://www.providentliving.org/ses/emotionalhealth/
0,12283,2129-1,00.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
The therapists from LDS Family Services do not concurrently serve as bishops or stake
presidents for, or hold any other responsible Church position with stewardship over, the
individuals they counsel, although they may hold such a calling in another ward or stake. Thus,
they do not act as religious authorities over their patients, although, no doubt, their advice is
heavily laced with religious principles. Because the therapists who work for LDS Family
Services clearly fit in Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s category of professional counselors for
whom liability should follow if they engage in sexual relations with a patient, there is no need
to decide if they would also fall within a category of liability for clergy.
156. Some of these professionals attempt to distinguish between their vocation and their
church calling by requiring members who require extensive counseling to make paid visits to
their offices. But if the member seeking counseling is economically limited, the religious
counselor may be reluctant to ask him or her to pay for the necessary counseling.
157. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1822.
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occasional meeting or a daylong seminar in training for their
ecclesiastical calling and are trained by other priesthood leaders,
almost none of whom has any training as a secular therapist. Thus,
application of the mechanical criteria in List One set out by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle would exclude almost all Latter-day
Saint leaders from liability for breach of fiduciary duty arising from a
counseling situation.
However, the criteria from Professor Lupu and Tuttle’s List
Two158 are significantly more troubling. List Two includes three
elements: holding a regular course of counseling sessions, addressing
personal matters, and generating information that gives the
counselor reason to know of special circumstances of vulnerability on
the part of the counseling recipient.159 As mentioned above,160 this
list could be interpreted to include virtually all counseling by clergy
in any faith. However, the risk is further increased in the context of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints because of the
frequency of interaction with leaders.161 For instance, most active
members meet with their bishop at least once a year to discuss their
donations.162 Because Church members are expected to pay ten
percent of their increase as tithing, this meeting will reveal to the
bishop information about family finances, especially if the member
has been unable to meet this commitment because of financial
pressures or poor planning. Church members also meet with their
bishop and stake president at least once every two years to discuss
their worthiness for a recommend allowing them to worship in
Church temples163 and on other occasions to discuss worthiness for

158. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83.
159. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1832.
160. See supra text accompanying note 83.
161. See Pearson, supra note 151, at 118 (“[The bishop] spends much time visiting with
or interviewing ward members. . . . He spends many hours interviewing and counseling youth.
. . . Where there is need, the bishop may be involved in counseling on a regular basis.”).
162. See David C. Bradford, Bishopric, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 122, 123
(explaining that bishops receive “an annual, personal report by ward members concerning the
donations they have made” to the church).
163. See Kim S. Cameron, Stake President, Stake Presidency, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 148, at 1414, 1415 (“Through personal interviews, stake presidencies certify the
worthiness of members to enter temples and to be ordained to Melchizedek Priesthood offices,
after they have been recommended to the stake president by their bishop.”); see also 2004
CHURCH ALMANAC 7 (Gerry Avant ed., 2004) (“Beginning Nov. 1, 2002, regular temple
recommends were valid for two years rather than one year.”).
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other purposes.164 Inquiries into worthiness are naturally laced with
personal information. In addition, if needed, bishops may provide
members or families general “counseling on a regular basis.”165 If a
person is vulnerable because of addictions, age, family problems,
prior traumatic experiences, guilt, or otherwise, the bishop, and
likely the stake president, would know. Thus, an argument could be
made—by expansively defining the ambiguous elements of List
Two—that every member of the Church who is actively involved is
in a counseling relationship with her bishop and stake president that
may qualify those leaders for liability in the case of sexual abuse.
Presumably, this is not what Professors Lupu and Tuttle would
intend. Unfortunately, List Two is not sufficiently restrictive.
b. Noncounseling fiduciary duties. Assuming that the counseling
relationship is not sufficient to qualify as professional or professionallike under Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s theory, is there a risk that
Latter-day Saint bishops and stake presidents may nonetheless be
subject to liability because of the religious nature of their positions?
Professors Lupu and Tuttle conclude that courts should not find a
fiduciary relationship based on the ecclesiastical relationship in the
absence of counseling qualifying under List One or List Two. They
argue that such a finding would require inquiry into “profoundly

164. See Linda A. Charney, Joining the Church, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at
758, 759 (“In the interview customarily conducted by an authorized Church representative
prior to baptism, the interviewer determines the candidate’s willingness and worthiness to
enter into the baptismal covenant.”); Dong Sull Choi, Confession of Sins, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 148, at 309 (Bishops meet with members who need to confess major sins); Larry C.
Farmer, Interviews, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 697, 697 (“Interviews of Church
members are conducted to determine personal worthiness, approve participation in religious
ceremonies and ordinances, assess needs, issue calls to service, listen to members’ concerns,
receive an accounting of performance in a Church assignment, and record a member’s status
regarding the payment of tithing.”); Bruce C. Hafen, Disciplinary Procedures, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 385, 386 (Bishops meet with members to hear
confessions, to determine worthiness for a temple recommend, to determine “worthiness
before recommending persons to serve as full-time missionaries,” and to determine worthiness
“before calling officers or teachers to serve in Church organizations, or before a member
enrolls at a Church-owned college or university.”); Pearson, supra note 151, at 117–18
(Bishops’ responsibilities include interviewing ward members to determine worthiness for
participation “in sacred ordinances, to receive the priesthood, to receive calls to serve in the
ward and on missions, and to do temple work.”).
165. Pearson, supra note 151, at 118.
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religious questions”166 in determining the true “theological” view of
the relationship as held by the priest and the parishioner.167 This
section argues that theirs is the proper conclusion for three reasons.
The first is how unusual and misunderstood a lay priesthood system
is. The second is how administratively difficult and theologically
strained it would be to take the necessary steps to protect against
lawsuits if broad claims were allowed against Latter-day Saint leaders
and the Church as an institution. The third is the extent to which
the institutional organization and clergy relations in the Church are
perceived differently even by devoted, fully involved Church
members, and exploring those perceptions would embroil a court in
an unconstitutional role. This section further discusses these three
points.
First, I address the significant implications of a lay clergy.
Certainly, a Latter-day Saint bishop or stake president is unlikely to
be seen as being as “qualified,” in a secular sense, as clergy in other
faiths. He has not undergone extensive theological training and may
not even hold a college degree. He is in office for only a few years.
Before and after his term, a bishop or stake president will hold the
same relationship to the Church as most other male members. A
member may know him as an ordinary plumber with whom jokes
and barbequed chicken have been exchanged. One of my colleagues
describes the distinction this way:
[A]re the following situations analogous? (1) You have lived in a
neighborhood for twenty years and your friend (your families have
vacationed together frequently) [is] called to be a bishop for a five
year term. (2) You have attended a church for twenty years and
been instructed weekly from the pulpit by the same person, whom
you assume will perhaps be your minister forever, or, at least will be
a minister until he retires. He does not live near you, and your
contact with him has always been minister-congregant specific.168

Thus, the dynamics of the clergy-member relationship in the
Church are tied to both the particularities of a lay priesthood and the
166. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1827 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 618 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003)).
167. Id. at 1826–28.
168. E-mail from Scott Cameron, Associate Dean, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 12,
2004) (on file with author).
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ordinariness of one’s neighbor in a rotating leadership position that
might even be held by one’s husband on the next rotation.
Furthermore, even this view is not without its complexity, as
demonstrated by the varying points of view of individual Church
members. In connection with writing this response, I asked the
thirty-four students in my jurisprudence class two questions arising
from the first few pages of Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s paper: “As
compared to clergy from other churches, (1) do LDS leaders
consistently disappoint?; and (2) in the last several years, has there
been a massive decline in the status of clergy and those who
supervise them?” The thirteen responses from Latter-day Saint
students fell into three general categories.
The first group responded that they perceive both statements to
be as true with respect to Latter-day Saint leaders as with leaders in
other religious traditions. The second group saw Latter-day Saint
leaders as less likely to be the subject of severe criticism than a leader
from a different faith because Latter-day Saint leaders are entirely lay
clergy. This group thought that unpaid leaders drawn from the
general ranks of membership were more easily seen as fallible and
more likely to be forgiven than professional clergy. As one student
explained, “a lay clergy lends itself to our being more forgiving and
understanding of others’ short-comings.”169 Another student
pointed out that “[u]sually people know the bishop before [he is]
the bishop, so they understand that [he is] human and kind of like
them; however, in general a person selected as bishop is well
respected and perceived as religious.”170 Thus, the view of the second
group suggests that the nature of a rapidly rotating lay clergy is not
conducive to arguing that the strong imbalance of power and
vulnerability characteristic of a fiduciary duty exists between a
member and a priesthood leader in the Church.
The third group of students took a different view of how to
compare Latter-day Saint clergy with clergy from other faith-based
institutions. One student said, “[t]he [issue] especially is relevant to
the LDS Church, but with a twist. LDS Church leaders do not just
169. E-mail from Daniel Swinton, Student, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 4, 2004)
(on file with author).
170. E-mail from Wendy Burt, Student, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 4, 2004)
(on file with author).
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purport to speak in the name of God, they actually do speak in His
name by the Spirit and as His duly authorized representatives.”171
Another said,
If a person’s concept of God is that He is actively involved with the
management of religion, then it is easier to place trust in a leader
because God would not let a leader run amuck. If God is not
involved with the management of His church then clergy cannot
rely on His support or guidance and we cannot rely on the wisdom
of men.172

Similarly, “[o]n one hand, one might expect less from [Latter-day
Saint clergy], since they are NOT professional men of God, while on
the other, one might expect more since the church is lead by the
Savior.”173
Thus, the perception of Latter-day Saint clergy among Church
members of fairly similar age and circumstances is subject to personal
variations. Moreover, the views of the third group are intensely tied
to theology and a faith-based knowledge, which is certainly not the
kind of inquiry a court may appropriately address.174 In any religion,
it makes sense that the faithful will inevitably believe their leaders are
more imbued with divine power than in any other religion.
Although there are limited published sources reporting on how
Latter-day Saint faithful perceive their relationship with leaders, a
2003 e-mail survey of more than 750 Latter-day Saint women who
were actively involved in religious life provides some insights.175 It
reveals that these female members of the Church view their
relationship with priesthood leaders in terms similar to the second
group of my students. The following comments are particularly

171. E-mail from Joshua Abbott, Student, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 4, 2004)
(on file with author).
172. E-mail from Jennifer Higa, Student, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 4, 2004)
(on file with author).
173. E-mail from Trevor Hickey, Student, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University, to Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (Feb. 4, 2004)
(on file with author).
174. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1826–28.
175. See Janiece Johnson, Patriarchy and Contentment: LDS Women’s Religious
Experience, 1970–Present, in LATTER-DAY SAINT WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
SUMMER FELLOWS’ PAPERS 93 (2003).
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significant in that they were given by those, who in the Church, do
not hold the priesthood and must rely on male priesthood leaders:
A 37-year-old mother in New York confessed that though she has
had very few problems with priesthood leaders, in two instances
leaders were “more fallible than I would have liked or needed at
the time.”176
For many it is an issue of the differences of individuals. As one 31year-old in Utah commented, “I have learned that just like there
are difficult women in my life, there are also difficult men . . . who
happen to hold the priesthood.”177
A 32-year-old in Texas stated: “I have a testimony of the power
they hold, but also realize some times they are very human.”178
Mentioning an unfortunate experience, a 34-year-old woman in
Texas commented, “everybody gets at least one [bad experience
with a priesthood leader], I believe, to test their faith . . . [.] Most
people are trying to do the best they can and sometimes we
disagree on what that is.”179

Although these women profess support for the Church and the office
of priesthood leaders, they do seem particularly attuned to the
human fallibility of lay leaders who do not have much training.
The differences in the above comments illustrate the individuality
of how people see leaders even within one church. Thus, the voices
illustrate the inherent difficulty faced by a court attempting to apply
any normative view to a religious relationship. The necessarily factspecific, individual inquiry would seem to require courts to
“resolv[e] questions of religious structure or theological
principle,”180 to “decide between . . . rival understandings.”181 As
Professors Lupu and Tuttle explain, “[a] court may no more
determine the ‘true’ theological meaning of a clergy-congregant

176. Id. at 102.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1804; see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious
Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1633.
181. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1827.
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relationship than it may determine the standard of a reasonable
cleric.”182
2. Missionaries
In addition to bishops and stake presidents, another group of
Latter-day Saint priesthood holders who have extensive contact with
individuals is missionaries. Although once someone joins the
Church, primary contact transfers from the missionaries to the
bishop and stake president, while investigating the Church, a
person’s primary priesthood contact is with missionaries.
As mentioned above, most Latter-day Saint missionaries are
males between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one. Other than
some basic language and religious training, missionaries have no
secular training, no formal qualifications (other than moral
worthiness), and no special church authority other than to teach the
Church’s message, interview prospective members for baptism, and
occasionally preside over small groups of members. Although
missionary work is usually a full-time endeavor, missionaries are lay
priesthood workers because they are not paid.183
Thus, Latter-day Saint missionaries do not engage in secular
counseling according to Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s List One: they
do not use secular professional techniques, hold themselves out as
secular counselors, publicly advertise, meet in clinical settings, or
receive payment.184 Further, they neither have undergone secular
training nor are qualified as counselors in a secular sense.
With respect to List Two, of course, the determination is more
complex.185 First, missionaries regularly discuss religion with
investigators. This may perhaps qualify as a “regular course” of
counseling in the sense that one party is looking to the other for
advice, new ways of conceptualizing life, and suggestions for
personal change, although not perhaps in the sense of psychological
“treatment.”186 Second, as explained above, no neat division exists

182. Id.
183. Missionaries or their families contribute to a Church-wide fund that helps cover
missionaries’ living and travel expenses.
184. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1821–22.
185. See id. at 1832.
186. Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not assume the term “counseling” requires
treatment. They refer to “informal counseling between friends” involving “the entrustment of
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between spiritual and personal counseling.187 But, as a general
matter, it can be assumed that meetings with missionaries are mainly
used to discuss doctrine, scriptures, and church principles. Finally,
one practical factor may be relevant both to the extent of the
personal trust established between a missionary and an investigator
and the opportunity to engage in sexual misconduct. Missionaries
are strictly required under mission rules to meet with others only in
the presence of their missionary companion or another missionary.188
Thus, counseling that includes extremely intimate details is unlikely,
and even then, the information is disclosed to two people. Of course,
breaches of mission rules do sometimes happen, but it would be
difficult even for a disobedient missionary to get away with one-onone meetings without a companion for any extended time.
Latter-day Saint missionaries are usually very young, they have
little or no formal religious education or training (like that provided
in seminaries or university theological courses), and they have almost
no authority on their own. Missionaries come in pairs, they
frequently rotate, spending only a few months in any given area, and
they are under the fairly tight direction of a mission president.
Besides, the investigator, prior to baptism, is still an outsider who has
other religious options and, in any event, has not chosen a religious
bond or subservience to the Church or to these missionaries, even if
a court could consider basing a fiduciary duty on the inherent nature
of the religious dependency.189 Thus, I am unconvinced that the
typical missionary-investigator relationship is one of fiduciary duty.

confidences and its attendant vulnerabilities,” but explain on other grounds why this
counseling does not create liability for sexual conduct. Id. at 1828.
187. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
188. The one exception to this is the private interview that an investigator is required to
have prior to baptism. These one-on-one interviews are conducted by missionaries specially
selected by the mission president for leadership positions, and the interviewing missionary’s
companion stays just outside the door during the interview.
189. Professors Lupu and Tuttle argue vehemently that it is unconstitutional for courts to
find duties based merely on religious behavior or belief, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at
1826–28, because to do so would single out clergy for more disadvantaged treatment than that
accorded others. Id. at 1831.
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C. Liability of Latter-day Saint Supervisors and the Church
1. Fiduciary duty
In addition to claims against individual clerics, Professors Lupu
and Tuttle discuss several theories of liability against supervisors and
churches. The first kind of claim against nonperpetrators raised by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle is a breach of fiduciary duty. Professors
Lupu and Tuttle describe this claim as different than the same claim
against an individual because “institutional fiduciary claims rarely
involve any close, personal connection between organizational
leaders and victims of sexual abuse”190 and because “members of the
religious community do not have any legitimate expectations that
organizations will respond to assertions of sexual misconduct by
clergy with actions taken for the sole benefit of the accuser.”191
With respect to the second point—expectation of undivided
loyalty in responding to abuse—the Latter-day Saint context raises
another but related issue. Latter-day Saint clergy are “judges in
Israel;”192 thus, a Church member who meets with her bishop or
stake president cannot properly view him as a fiduciary that is
committed to adopting her viewpoint or meeting her desires.
Bishops and stake presidents primarily represent the Church, and no
matter how sympathetic and helpful, they are charged with making
judgments and taking necessary official Church action, which
potentially includes: releasing a member from a calling, asking a
member not to take the sacrament or pray in meetings for a period
of time, canceling a member’s temple recommend, holding a
disciplinary council, or even excommunicating a member.193 Latter190. Id. at 1835.
191. Id. at 1836.
192. See Vaughn J. Featherstone, The Gospel of Jesus Christ Is the Golden Door, ENSIGN,
Jan. 1974, at 82, 82 (“In the 107th section of the Doctrine and Covenants, we read: ‘The
office of a bishop is in administering all temporal things;’ and also to be a judge in Israel, ‘to
do the business of the church, to sit in judgment upon transgressors . . . .’” (citing Doctrine &
Covenants 107:68, 72)); James A. Cullimore, Confession and Forsaking: Elements of Genuine
Repentance, ENSIGN, Dec. 1971, at 85, 85 (“A bishop is the father of the ward, the presiding
high priest of the ward, and a common judge in Israel. One of the areas in which he sits in
judgment is when he must determine one’s worthiness to hold office in the Church, to
officiate in Church ordinances, to hold temple recommends, etc.”).
193. See Hafen, supra note 164, at 386 (“Because bishops are primarily concerned with
the spiritual development of each member, they have wide discretion to make judgments and
to give the counsel most likely to assist the member’s spiritual progress and, where needed, the
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day Saint leaders—who must make these judgments based on unique
theological grounds and according to revelation and personal
inspiration194—may or may not consider a woman’s consent to a
sexual relation blameless based on her vulnerabilities and power
disparities, and any expectation to the contrary is unwarranted.
2. Negligent employment and supervision
a. Local leaders. The second cause of action addressed by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle is the tort of negligent employment,
training, and supervision.195 Under this theory, a plaintiff must
establish that a supervisor or the institution was negligent in hiring,
training, and supervising the perpetrator.196 Further, the
nonperpetrators in the organization must have had sufficient
knowledge of the risks to give rise to a duty to act.197 I argue in this
section that the administrative burden of a rigid standard of hiring,
training, or supervising in the Church would be extreme, that
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s proposal to require actual knowledge
would be helpful, but ultimately not enough to provide the Church
an appropriate level of protection.
This theory of recovery is less applicable in the Latter-day Saint
context in the technical sense, since Latter-day Saint clergy are not
paid employees. However, some commentators have interpreted the
term “employee” to include volunteers acting as agents and under
the control of another entity, regardless of whether actual
compensation is paid.198 I will assume for this section that a
member’s repentance. . . . In the most serious cases, bishops may impose disciplinary sanctions
ranging from informal, probationary restrictions to formal proceedings that can result in
disfellowshipment or excommunication from the Church.”).
194. See Porter, supra note 150, at 278–79 (“[A]ll leaders and members are entitled to
divine inspiration within the scope of their responsibilities.”).
195. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1847.
196. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1958).
197. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1867; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228(1)(d) (1958).
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958) (defining “servant”); see
also Jamie Lake, Screening School Grandparents: Ensuring Continued Safety and Success of School
Volunteer Programs, 8 ELDER L.J. 423, 444–47 (2000) (arguing that a school board can be
vicariously liable for misconduct of volunteer where volunteer is considered servant if he acted
within scope of his engagement in school and school has control over volunteer through
supervision and enforcement of policies). For more examples, see Allan Manley, Annotation,
Liability of Charitable Organization Under Respondeat Superior Doctrine for Tort of Unpaid
Volunteer, 82 A.L.R. 3d 1213 (1978).
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volunteer relationship is appropriate for the imposition of a tort
relating to hiring, training, and supervising—although I am
unconvinced that is a foregone conclusion.
One tremendous problem with supervisory torts in the religious
context, according to Professors Lupu and Tuttle, is how a court
should determine who has sufficient knowledge or a sufficient duty
to investigate, plus the ability to take action to prevent harm.199 This
is certainly true in the Latter-day Saint context. With respect to
“hiring,” Latter-day Saint leaders rely on inspiration in the process of
calling, ordaining, and investing a bishop or stake president in office,
and the process may occur in less than a week.200 Some objectively
verifiable safeguards do exist. Most men called to be bishops and
stake presidents have been members of the Church for many years.
When called, these bishops and stake presidents are presented to the
entire congregation for a sustaining vote, and any member of the
congregation is free to raise an objection if they know of any reason
that the person is not fit for service.201 Moreover, if the Church has
previously disciplined a man for predatory sexual conduct, he cannot
be called to serve as bishop or stake president.202 Nonetheless,

199. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1867.
200. See William G. Dyer, Leadership Training, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at
817, 818 (1992) (“Sometimes [a person] is appointed to a position to which he has had no
training, as the bishop or stake president follows the impressions of the Spirit in extending calls
to service.”); Pearson, supra note 151, at 117 (“After prayerful deliberation, the stake
presidency proposes a new bishop to the First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.
. . . In selecting a bishop, a stake presidency ordinarily considers testimony, judgment,
commitment, and charity toward ward members . . . .”); Porter, supra note 150, at 279
(“[C]allings are believed to be made under divine inspiration.”); Robert E. Quinn, Common
Consent, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at 297, 298 (“Callings to positions of Church
service . . . and ordination to the priesthood are made by inspiration of the authorized
leaders . . . .”).
201. See Cameron, supra note 163, at 1415 (“As with all officers in the Church, members
of the stake presidency must be sustained by the vote of the members over whom they
preside.” (citation omitted)); Pearson, supra note 151, at 117 (“The bishop is sustained by a
vote of the congregation . . . .”); Pitcher, supra note 148, at 250 (“[N]o person is to serve in
an official calling without the consent of the membership. The sustaining vote is not an
election, but signifies that members know of no reason why the individual should be
disqualified from service and that they are willing to offer cooperation and support.” (citations
omitted)); Quinn, supra note 200, at 298 (“Members do not nominate persons to office, but
are asked to give their sustaining vote to decisions of presiding councils . . . .”).
202. See Gordon B. Hinckley, Personal Worthiness To Exercise the Priesthood, ENSIGN,
May 2002, at 52, 54 (“Even if a person who abused a child sexually or physically receives
Church discipline and is later restored to full fellowship or readmitted by baptism, leaders
should not call the person to any position working with children or youth unless [authorized
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imposing a requirement of “reasonable ordination” would cut deeply
into the Latter-day Saint concept of inspiration and would force any
reviewing court to delve deeply (and unconstitutionally) into
religious doctrine and belief.
With respect to training and supervising, the sheer enormity of
the task makes imposing higher standards on the Church in this area
unreasonable, and if the Church tried to comply, it would require a
substantial restructuring of Church organization and leadership.
Because the Church is run worldwide by a lay priesthood, made up
of men who must also earn a living and who have limited terms of
office, strict supervision is difficult. The number of bishops and stake
presidents at any one time is staggering,203 and the callings rotate
rapidly. Given the professed role of inspiration in the Church, the
size of the organization, and the lay, short-term nature of leadership
positions, a government imposition of “elaborate, expensive, and
rigid systems of surveillance”204 would surely violate the
Establishment Clause.
Professors Lupu and Tuttle are convincing in their assessment
that the knowledge of one Latter-day Saint leader cannot reasonably
be imputed to the Church’s central administration in Salt Lake
City.205 After being formally installed in their callings, Latter-day
Saint bishops and stake presidents are interviewed on a regular
basis.206 But, there is no formal mechanism for obtaining feedback
by] the First Presidency.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, CHURCH HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS, bk. 1, at
157–58 (1998))).
203. See F. Michael Watson, Statistical Report, 2003, ENSIGN, May 2004, at 26, 26
(listing 2,624 stakes, each of which has a stake president, and 26,237 wards and branches, each
of which has a bishop or branch president, as of December 31, 2003).
204. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1869.
205. See id. at 1869–71.
206. See R. Wayne Boss, Priesthood Interview, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 148, at
1142, 1142–43 (“The Church has developed a system of regularly scheduled priesthood
interviews for effective over-seeing of delegated responsibilities . . . . The priesthood interview
is widely used as an administrative procedure between levels of Church organization and assists
Church leaders” to organize assignments and receive stewardship reports.); Dyer, supra note
148, at 818 (“A leader may confer with his or her own priesthood leader about a problem or
need, especially in one’s “stewardship review”—a one-on-one session with one’s organizational
leader. These personal interviews are customarily held four times a year.”); Farmer, supra note
164, at 697–98 (“Interviews of Church members are conducted to . . . receive an accounting
of performance in a Church assignment . . . . Members in any calling report on their
performance and provide their supervisors with nonconfidential information concerning those
they are called to serve.”); see also CONTEMPORARY MORMONISM SOCIAL SCIENCE
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from members or for fielding reports about the conduct of a leader,
although this certainly happens informally. Professors Lupu and
Tuttle are acutely aware of this kind of administrative burden. They
suggest importing the requirement of “actual malice”—knowing
falsehood or reckless disregard—from the freedom of the press cases
to provide a baseline for finding liability.207 They acknowledge that
any broader basis for liability “would require expensive and sweeping
precautions.”208 Therefore, Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s proposed
“alternative approach”209 based on the freedom of the press cases,
and their supporting arguments, are extremely appealing in the
Latter-day Saint context, and would provide a substantial degree of
protection with respect to supervisory torts.
b. Missionaries. With respect to Latter-day Saint missionaries, the
administrative burden of supervision is in some sense is both more
and less onerous than with nonmissionary leaders. At any one time,
there are upwards of 60,000 young Latter-day Saint missionaries in
full time service all over the world.210 Most full-time missionaries
begin their service as missionaries at age nineteen or in their early
twenties. Most serve for two years, during which time many of them
must also learn a foreign language. The ratio of time devoted to
training versus time in service must be considered. Although for each
mission there is a full-time older mission president, he is responsible
on average for 184 missionaries,211 who may be stationed many
hours’ travel away. These all make for difficulties in supervision.
On the other hand, missionaries are subject to strict rules, and
are required to report, have regular interviews with the mission
president, and must constantly be with an assigned companion.
Missionaries are also expected to report any improper behavior by
their companions. These factors may suggest that supervision of
missionaries is perhaps slightly easier than supervision of bishops, but
these factors are more than trumped by the colossal number of
missionaries, their age and inexperience, and the time restraints

PERSPECTIVES 166 (Marie Cornwall et al. eds., 1994) (“Each missionary is regularly
interviewed, evaluated, and counseled by mission officials.”).
207. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1861–63.
208. Id. at 1863.
209. Id. at 1858.
210. See Thomas S. Monson, They Pray and They Go, ENSIGN, May 2002, at 49, 50.
211. See 2004 CHURCH ALMANAC 414–38 (Gerry Avant ed., 2004).
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during which many must learn a foreign language as well as meet
their missionary obligations. If courts were to impose broad
supervisory duties, the Church would have to face the risks of
liability or reexamine its theological commitment to worldwide
missionary work.212
3. Respondeat superior
The third kind of liability for the institution discussed by
Professors Lupu and Tuttle is respondeat superior. Initially,
application of respondeat superior seems unsuitable for application in
the Latter-day Saint context. Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest
that courts determine the appropriate principal by using the five
factors from J.M. v. Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of
God,213 including a determination of the “mode of payment.”214
Further, they suggest that courts can avoid constitutionally sensitive
determinations by simply deciding, based on IRS standards, whether
the wrongdoer is an employee or an independent contractor.215
Priesthood leaders are not paid, and are not employees, and
therefore cannot be easily linked to a principal. So the suggestions
offered by Professors Lupu and Tuttle to avoid constitutional
entanglements for purposes of determining a principal do not
translate well into the Latter-day Saint context.
D.

Insufficiency of the Shield

I discuss in this Section particular issues that arise when
considering the various legal theories and suggestions discussed in
Sexual Misconduct in the context of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. Some of Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
recommendations for a more constitutionally sensitive approach to
clergy abuse cases are very helpful. One example is the standards they
describe in List One for dividing secular counseling from purely
212. “Encumbering them, however, with special duties of loyalty to their adherents,
who may number in the many millions and be spread across the globe, inevitably involves
either a rearrangement in their structure, policy, or practice of relations with clergy, or, if
they are unwilling to so rearrange under the pressures of tort law, a system of fines upon
them for continuing to rely on structures of authority inadequate to control clergy who
misbehave.” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1845.
213. 658 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
214. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1882.
215. Id. at 1883 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 111).
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spiritual counseling.216 Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s analysis of the
difficulties of determining standards for reasonable hiring, training,
and supervising clergy, and the unconstitutional consequences of
allowing court judgments to pressure religions to restructure, seems
particularly appropriate in the Latter-day Saint context, as does their
prediction that basing fiduciary duty on religious understandings will
require inappropriate judicial inquiry into differing understandings
among Church members. The meat of Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s
“Alternative Approach”—the application of restraints from the
freedom of the press cases—recognizes and accounts for the
difficulties of supervision and the limits in attributing information in
an organization such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints. Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s recognition that Latter-day
Saint leaders have duties of loyalty other than to the abused member
is constructive, in light of the Latter-day Saint clergy’s role as judges.
On the other hand, some aspects of their analysis, such as the
elements in List Two for determining when nonprofessional
counseling ought to give rise to liability,217 seem unwisely broad in
light of the kinds of counseling common in the Church. More
importantly, all of the concerns raised in Part II regarding the sparse
and frail nature of the immunity suggested by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle in certain areas continue to apply in the Latter-day Saint
context, just as they do with respect to other churches.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professors Lupu and Tuttle are sympathetic to the plight of
clergy and churches in our litigious society and are firmly committed
to the principles behind the Establishment Clause. They
acknowledge the jumbled state of the case law in the area of clergy
sexual abuse and effectively explain and assess exiting law. Professors
Lupu and Tuttle also provide a critique of the appropriateness of
each theory of liability in light of constitutional concerns. Then,
Professors Lupu and Tuttle seek to articulate a normative
compromise position by which to preserve some measure of
ecclesiastical immunity in cases where intrusiveness into the domain
of religion is most egregious and still permit liability when public
policy trumps any claims of religious distinctiveness. This is a
216. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 1821–22.
217. Id. at 1831–32.
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laudatory goal, and they may well offer the best that can be expected
in the existing legal climate. However, the current social and political
trend is vigorously moving toward erasing any vestige of ecclesiastical
immunity.218 A case for compromise to combat that trend requires an
easily workable standard of application with a compelling justification
for cases that should qualify for protection.
Although the scheme offered by Professors Lupu and Tuttle
presents much that is worthy of recommendation, it also raises some
concerns. The first is coverage. With respect to individual
perpetrators, for instance, exempting cases involving child victims
and cases in which adult victims were in secular counseling
relationships leaves a relatively small percentage of cases. I doubt
their proposal provides enough protection to matter much in the
overall picture of liability of churches and clergy. In addition, some
of the characterizations of immunity offered by Professors Lupu and
Tuttle are vigorous, specific and imaginative; others are vague
cautions that can easily be interpreted and diluted by courts.
The second issue is whether the distinctions Professors Lupu and
Tuttle draw in crafting an immunity can withstand erosion. Some of
the standards Professors Lupu and Tuttle offer for defining secular
counseling permit flexible and expansive applications that may cut
deeply into the scope of the immunity. I suggest that the analogies
Professors Lupu and Tuttle draw between kinds of fiduciaries is
fraught with over- and underinclusiveness that further blur the
issues. Furthermore, I remain concerned that courts may be sliding
toward overly expansive definitions of scope of authority in vicarious
liability law and fiduciary duties of institutions. If this is true, many
cases will escape Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s scheme of protection
in the category of negligent supervision torts.
While I have almost no sympathy for individual perpetrators of
sexual exploitation, the consequences of eliminating their immunity
may well rain down upon supervisors and churches who were not
participants in the abuse. I care very much about this. Courts should
indeed be sensitive in these cases to constitutional issues, as
Professors Lupu and Tuttle argue, and courts should carefully apply
the other restraints so ably argued by Professors Lupu and Tuttle.
However, I fear that Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s suggestions of

218. See supra note 1.
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how to be sensitive are too tenuous and vague to offer much
protection.
A useful understanding evolves when Professors Lupu and
Tuttle’s categories and suggestions are applied to The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Certainly, one of the best points
made by Professors Lupu and Tuttle when applied to the Church is
the notion that probing the nature of the unique religious experience
is beyond the competence of a secular court. The Church rests on
fundamentally different principles and practices from many other
religions, and even within the Latter-day Saint faithful, some
individuals harbor very different perceptions of the role of clergy and
the nature of the relationship between clergy and member.
Moreover, Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s suggestions for limiting the
liability of religious institutions for supervisory torts also make
excellent practical sense with respect to the Church. If liability
attached only if the Church knew or should have known of a
particular perpetrator’s propensity and took no action, few of these
potential cases would survive. The administrative burden of
transforming the functions of Latter-day Saint clergy to fit strict
requirements of training and information sharing to avoid liability
would be nearly impossible. Latter-day Saint leaders are lay leaders
with short term appointments all over the world.
More troubling are Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s suggestions for
when to find a counseling relationship to be a basis for liability,
particularly in the context of the regular interviews with Latter-day
Saint priesthood leaders characteristic of the Church. Further, any
unnecessary fissures in the shield of immunity will inflict a burden on
the Church just as they will other religions.
Although perpetrators certainly should not be allowed to
continue to sexually victimize adult women, I am deeply concerned
about the impact of liability on religious institutions. It is unlikely
that courts in this decade will be willing to adopt a full-blown
doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity. However, I urge the recognition
that commentators and judges must continue to explore the
possibilities of a more complete and thorough balance between the
demands of tort law and the unique position of religion in our
constitutional values. While their goal is admirable and many of their
suggestions excellent, Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s paper, Sexual
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, does not go far enough to
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develop a concrete, tangible shield to provide churches the
protection they deserve.
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